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Abstract 
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) are known to facilitate liberalization with respect to only 
a few trading partners and thus they have been a topic of debate for the past two decades 
especially because their effect on most favored nation (MFN) tariffs is known to be ambiguous. 
We provide insights for analyzing whether the PTAs indeed hamper or support multilateral 
liberalization. Using product level official and actual tariffs we provide evidence from the United 
States (US) import data that the stumbling block effect on the US MFN bound tariffs is present 
only for goods that receive full preference in books or in actual. However, my dataset does not 
statistically support the stumbling block hypothesis in the case of Applied tariffs.………………..
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) have become an integral part of the world 
economy landscape especially since past two decades. PTAs can be bilateral or unilateral in 
nature. Free trade agreements (FTAs) and Customs Unions (CUs) represent bilateral agreements 
since member countries exchange preferential access. On the other hand, unilateral agreements 
usually refer to a developed country offering developing countries unilateral preferential access 
to its market. The increasing importance of PTAs is undeniable according to the world trade 
statistics. According to WTO, the number of PTA notifications amounted to 124 in the period 
1948-1994. This number increased to over 300 in the time period 1995 -20111. As Limão (2006) 
shows, “PTAs can affect multilateral trade liberalization (MTL) through various channels.  They 
can divert the scarce negotiation resources, alter the number of negotiating parties and their 
bargaining power and affect the countries optimal multilateral tariffs in all or subset of goods.” 
There has been a lot of discussion on whether these PTAs either represent an obstacle to freer 
trade policies sponsored by the WTO or a stepping-stone towards freer trade. But no consensus 
has still been reached on the effects of PTAs on MTL2.  
In this paper we take a step forward towards analyzing the effect of PTAs on the US 
(United States) multilateral liberalization. We use product level data on the US imports from 
different sources as described below (Chapter-2) and create various sub groups of products 
imported in the US market. Limão (2006) has shown that US PTAs caused smaller reduction in 
multilateral tariffs of the goods it imported from its PTAs relative to similar non-PTA goods. 
Their results show a significantly larger stumbling block effect from the subset of goods that are 
                                                
1 Tobias et al.(2012), footnote 1 
2 Frankel et al. (1996) show that PTA’s can raise welfare for rich countries, provided the margin of prefrence is not 
set too high. They assume that the first best solution of worldwide free trade is not attainable for political reasons. 
Thus the choice –betweeen a status quo of non discriminatory MFN tariffs and a move to PTAs is an exercise in 
theory of the second best. Generalising beyond pure FTA’s to PTA’s they found that a small margin of preferences 
for continental neighbours is always beneficial in their framework. 
Krugman (1991) has shown in his model (without any transportation cost) that the economic welfare is diminished 
by a move from a system where a large number of individual countries post MFN tariffs, to a system of FTAs. 
Krishna (1998) , within the framewrok of his paper found, ‘PTAs that divert trade away from the rest of the world 
are more likely to be supported politically and will reduce the multilateral liberalization . In some cases this 
reduction in incentives coud be critical: multilateral liberalization that is initially feasible could be rendered 
infeasible by preferential arrangements.”.  
Levy (1997), shows that bileteral free-trade agreements can never increase political support for multilateral free 
trade. 
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exported to the US under every PTA. They even found a direct stumbling block effect for 
agreements with small countries. Notice, that the unilateral agreements are exactly the ones that 
should cause a stumbling block effect, as they are an exchange of preferential access for 
accomplishing non-economic objectives. Bilateral agreements would not necessarily cause 
stumbling block effect, as there is an exchange of preferential access is both ways. Using Limão 
(2006) strategy, we check if the stumbling block effect as found in his paper is present for all 
different groups of products in the US imports. We revisit a few results reached in Limão (2006) 
and present our findings in this paper. Our definition and choice of the groups of products from 
the US imports that we intend to analyze in this work was inspired from the various key papers 
mentioned below. 
 Karacaovali & Limão (2008), supports the stumbling block effect -“Using products level 
tariffs negotiated by the European Union (EU) in the last two multilateral trade rounds we find 
that several of its PTAs have clashed with its MTL”. The model described in this paper shows 
that only products that receive full preferential access to the importing market (i.e., preferential 
tariff is zero) should have a stumbling block effect. This is important because Limão (2006) does 
not control for the type of preference (full/partial). On the empirical side, Karacaovali and Limão 
(2008) investigate whether preferential agreements involving the members of the European 
Union have led to a stumbling or building block effect on the EU's multilateral trade 
liberalization efforts during the Uruguay round of negotiations. Interestingly, the authors 
consider unilateral and bilateral agreements involving the EU and show that unilateral 
agreements have generated a stumbling block effect on the EU's multilateral policy. The same 
applies to the case of Free Trade areas but this does not apply to the customs unions. This shows 
once again that the type of PTAs involved is an important issue in the investigation of the effects 
of PTA formation. 
There have been a lot of researches that have shown concerns on the projected ill effects 
of PTAs. Some researchers have shown concern on the overall effect and the economic 
importance of preferential access granted by the PTAs. They have questioned how effective are 
these preferences in the light of the pervasive presence of other non-trade barriers (NTB). Anson 
et al. (2005) argue that “in the predominantly North-South recent wave of PTAs, rules of origin 
(ROO) have been set up in a complex and non uniform manner, so that in practice these PTAs 
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provide little market access. As a result, compliance costs have largely eroded the preferential 
access afforded by the PTA, leading us to suggest that southern partners are effectively left on 
their participation constraint.” They found that for NAFTA, ROO largely undid preferential tariff 
access, suggesting that North-South PTAs may well offer little market access to the southern 
partners. Among other things, their findings suggest that we should be careful in using official 
tariffs in measuring preferential access. For this reason, we construct actual measures of 
preferential access as suggested below (Chapter-2). 
Ozden & Reinhardt (2005) have shown that countries removed from GSP adopt more 
liberal policies than those remaining eligible. Therefore, they suggest that the developing 
countries may be best served by full integration into reciprocity- based world trade regime rather 
than the continued GSP-style preferences. These findings in this paper are based on unilateral 
agreements that are full of hidden barriers and sudden changes in the grant of preferences. Since, 
we also intend to analyze the unilateral agreements (ATPA, CBI and GSP) in our work, we 
consider it is important to measure preferential access using official and actual tariffs as 
proposed by this work. 
Estevadeordal et al. (2008) examined the effect of regionalism on unilateral trade 
liberalization using industry level data on most favored nation (MFN) Applied tariffs and 
bilateral preferences for ten Latin American countries from 1990 to 2001. They found that a 
preferential tariff reduction in a given sector leads to a reduction in the external (MFN) tariff in 
that sector. They also found, that the external liberalization is greater if preferences are granted 
to important suppliers. In their study, these effects were absent for customs unions and only 
present for free trade agreements. Overall, they find that preferential treatment generates a 
building block to multilateral free trade. Their paper shows that it is important to consider the 
effects of preferential access on Applied MFN tariffs, since multilateral agreements only focus 
on tariff bindings but, they allow countries to apply tariffs that may be set below their tariff 
bindings. We take this key issue into account in this work. 
Ketterer et al. (2012) explored the determinants of Canada’s tariff cuts at HTS-8, and 
found that the Canadian-US free trade agreement (CUSFTA) acted as an additional driver of 
Canadian multilateral tariff reductions during the Uruguay round. In other words, CUSFTA 
served as a building block for the Canadian multilateral trade policy. They show that since a 
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FTA is characterized by the exchange of market access with a large and competitive trading 
partner, the agreement can cause leakage of protectionist benefits to domestic industry from 
lobbying against external tariff cuts. This rent destruction effect of an FTA can cause policy 
makers to be more aggressive in cutting multilateral tariffs. This once again makes the type of 
PTA, a key issue to investigate. 
Notice that the results of all these above-mentioned studies do not concur on the ill or 
positive effects of a country’s PTAs on its multilateral trade liberalization.  All these findings are 
derived from different dataset consisting of countries that are very different from the US and 
hence the findings from any one sample may or may not hold true in case of the US. Therefore, 
we decided to start our investigation by first creating a dataset that would enable us to distinguish 
products according to the degree of preferential access using the actual and official preferential 
rates.  We then enriched our dataset by pooling in the data from other researchers (Romali’s 
dataset and dataset from Limão (2006), which we discuss in detail in the next section. Using this 
unique dataset we test whether the insights in the literature are also relevant in case of the US. 
We investigate partial and full preferences, the degree of importance of particular products (large 
imports) and margin of preferences, applied versus bound tariffs and effects of different PTAs 
(unilateral versus bilateral). 
Not all of our findings support the results from the literature discussed above. Like 
Karacaovali & Limão (2008), we found that the stumbling block effect on MFN tariff bounds is 
only generated from the products that get full preferences in books or actual. Unlike Limão 
(2006), we did not find any larger stumbling block effect from the products that get full 
preference (in books) under all PTAs as compared to the products that get full preference (in 
books) only under some PTAs but not all. We found that the products with full preferences but 
smaller margins (both in books and in actual) have a stronger stumbling block effect than the 
products with full preferences but large margins in books or in actual. We also found, that the 
stumbling block effect from products that receive full preferences under any PTA in books and 
have either small margin or small export volume, is identical to the products that get full 
preferences in any PTA in the books but with big margin and large export volume (this result is 
same in case of actual tariffs too). Furthermore, we found that on an average, FTAs have a 
smaller stumbling block effect on the US MFN bounds than the unilateral trade agreements. 
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Most importantly, we did not find any significant evidence of the stumbling block effect from 
PTAs in case of the US Applied tariffs. 
 In the next chapter, we present data description that allows us to discuss how we define 
different groups of products in the US imports. This dataset created by us, facilitated our 
investigation on the impact of PTAs on the US multilateral tariffs and the nature of different 
PTAs involving the US until the mid-1990s.  
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Chapter 2 - Data Description 
In this section, we describe the compilation of the dataset that enables us to re-examine 
some of the conclusions reached in Limão (2006). This requires, the identification of products 
that receive full preferential access to the US market, under the different preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) sponsored by the US and that were included in Limão's (2006) work. We, 
measure full (duty free) preferential access, both in terms of the official tariff set on different 
products imported by the US through its PTAs, as well as in terms of the duties collected at US 
customs. Moreover, we collected data on Applied MFN (most-favored-nation) tariffs for 
different years to ascertain whether the formation of these PTAs has acted as a stumbling block 
to the US multilateral trade policy. This is important; as the Applied MFN tariffs are the 
appropriate policy tool to measure the degree of market access as well as the protectionist degree 
of US trade policy relative to the rest of the world. These are the main reasons that drive the 
organization of this work's dataset. We organize the dataset at the product level using the 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the US at eight digits (HTS-8)3. The HTS 8 comprises a 
hierarchical structure, subdivided into eight digit rate lines unique to the US for describing all 
goods in trade for duty, quota, and statistical purposes.  
2.1 Data on imports and duties collected  
 The United States International Trade commission’s (USITC) website provides detailed 
data on imports and duty collected for the US economy. In particular, it allows us to distinguish 
imports by the program used to sell foreign goods in the US, as well as the duties collected under 
the different programs. We collect information at HTS-8 on trade for the different preferential 
programs under investigation. The five preferential trade programs under consideration and the 
beneficiary countries in each program for the year 1994 are following: 
 (i) Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) –Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.  
(ii) Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) – List in Appendix A 
(iii) Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) --- List in Appendix A 
(iv) ISRAEL Free Trade Agreement (ISRAEL) --- Israel 
(v) North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) -- Mexico and Canada 
                                                
3 (http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/industry-manufacturing/industrial-tariffs/tariff-schedules). 
 
  
7 
 The data collected from USITC contains the value of imports and duties paid at the US 
customs, for each group of countries that benefit from one of the five PTAs described above. 
Notice, that not all products exported from the countries listed above are eligible for preferential 
access in the US market. Moreover, some products are exported through a preferential program 
as well as through the MFN regime, possibly because of the presence of tariffs or hidden barriers 
to trade (export ceilings, rules of origin, administrative costs). Thus, imports from these countries 
can enter the US market through the MFN regime, where they pay the same duties as applied to 
the rest of the world, the GSP program and through the PTA program in question. 
We then proceeded by downloading for each PTAj (j = ATPA, CBI, GSP, ISRAEL and 
NAFTA), information about imports through the MFN regime, imports through the GSP, and 
imports through the PTA in question for the years of 1989 to 2011. Duties paid under the 
different alternative programs were also downloaded. This dataset enables us to understand and 
cross verify the value of US imports from these five groups of countries, by checking whether or 
not the total value of imports equals the summation of imports through the MFN, GSP and 
through the PTA program in question. 
Some key observations from this data for the year of 1994 are summarized in Table 2.1 
below. Column 1 lists the five PTA programs; Column 2 gives the value of total imports in 
million dollars to the US from the member countries of the respective PTA programs; Column 3 
lists the different import programs that these member countries can use to import to the US; 
Column 4 shows the percentage of total US imports by import program. As mentioned 
previously, not all products exported by the member countries of a PTA received preferential 
access to the US market. Furthermore, only a fraction of products that were officially granted 
preferential access were exported through a preferential regime. Column 5 gives the percentage 
of products that in spite of having a preferential access enter the US economy also via the MFN 
regime.   
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Table 2.1: US imports by PTA   
PTAs 
Total 
Imports'94 
(Millions of $) 
Import 
Programs 
Custom 
Value of 
Imports in % 
% of products that receive 
preference under a PTA but 
also export through MFN'94 
ATPA 5,879 
MFN 82.6 
25.58 GSP 5.8 
ATPA 11.6 
CBI 11,023 
MFN 78.7 
26.1 GSP 3.4 
CBI 17.9 
GSP 91,142 
MFN 81.1 
69.25 GSP 18.9 
 ---- ----  
ISRAEL 5,159 
MFN 54.5 
16.3 GSP 8.2 
ISRAEL 37.3 
NAFTA 142,462 
MFN 44.6 
66.41 GSP 0 
NAFTA 55.4 
Source: author using data provided by the USITC.gov 
 
Column 2 of Table 2.1 shows, that the total imports to the US in the year 1994 from 
NAFTA member countries were the highest, at $142,462 million, followed by imports from the 
GSP, CBI, ATPA and ISRAEL member countries. Notice, that Israel and NAFTA are bilateral 
free trade agreements (created under article XXIV of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 
that entails elimination of almost all internal trade barriers within the partners. Israel was the first 
FTA signed by the US and it came into force in the year of 1985, while NAFTA came into force 
in the year of 1994. We observe that NAFTA is an important free trade agreement for the US 
considering the sheer size of custom value of imports from Canada and Mexico. On the other 
hand, GSP that has over 127 member countries (list in Appendix A) comes at a distant second in 
terms of custom value of imports entering the US. PTAs like CBI, ATPA and GSP are unilateral 
agreements supported by the enabling clause in GATT- ‘contracting parties may accord 
differential and more favorable treatment to developing countries, without according such 
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treatment to other contracting parties4. For example: ATPA is a unilateral trade agreement which 
was created to help four Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) in their fight 
against drug production and trafficking by expanding their economic alternatives through 
enhanced access to the US market5. 
Of the total imports from NAFTA members in the year 1994, over 55 % (column 4) 
entered the US via NAFTA. On the other hand, over 82 % of the total imports from ATPA 
members entered the US market, through the MFN regime and only less than 12 % were through 
the ATPA preference regime. Since, ATPA is a unilateral preference granted by the US, it is 
rather selective in granting preference (number of products qualifying for preferential access is 
small). The enabling clause discussed above, grants developed countries the ability to select the 
range of products that are eligible for preferences as well as the degree of access to the its market 
(the US in our case). Also, it has additional guidelines relating to the rules of origin and stricter 
terms relating to the fulfillment of non-trade objectives, resulting in hidden barriers to trade 
(increased administrative costs) attached to the trade through ATPA.  
We found, that over one fourth (column 5) of the total products that had preferential 
access via ATPA also entered the US via MFN. This is also true for CBI where over 26 % of 
goods that qualified for preferential access entered the US also via MFN. Over 69 % of the total 
products that qualified for GSP access, did not completely avail this preference and were also 
imported via the MFN regime.  For NAFTA, this figure was even more astounding where over 
66 % of total goods that had preferential access, also used the MFN regime. Sometimes, policy 
changes take time to generate their expected effects. NAFTA was implemented in 1994 and 
should lead to duty free access for the vast majority of products among member countries since it 
corresponds to a free trade area. So, we calculated and found that in 1996 about 52 % of goods 
that received preferential access under NAFTA also entered the US via the MFN regime. 
 As said above, we would like to identify products that receive full (duty free) preferential 
access in the US market. One of the ways, in which we identify these cases, is by selecting 
products that officially should receive preferential access and that can enter into the US market 
without paying duties as suggested by the US customs data. We create a term called "actual 
preferential tariffs" to assist us in identifying these products.  
                                                
4 (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22183.pdf) 
5 (http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference-programs/andean-trade-preference-act-atpa) 
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Actual preferential tariffs (𝑡!"#$!%!"#$ ) defined as follows:    
 
                          (𝑡!"#$!%!!"# )!"# = !"#$%&  !"#$!"#!"#$%&  !"#$%!"#     (1) 
where, i = product code at HTS-8; j=ATPA, CBI, GSP, ISRAEL, NAFTA; t = 1994, 1996 
2.2 Data on MFN Applied tariffs and on official preferential tariffs (Romali’s 
dataset) 
As discussed earlier, we need to collect information about the actual (equation 1) and 
official preferential tariffs levied on goods imported by the US from countries that receive 
preferences under the different PTAs mentioned above. As discussed in the introduction, as well 
as in the section describing the empirical strategy, only the goods receiving duty free access 
should generate a stumbling block effect on US multilateral policy. Data on preferential tariffs 
actually paid by exporters to sell to the US market (𝑡!"#$!%!"#$ ) was sourced from USITC as 
described in the previous section. Data on official preferential tariffs (𝑡!""#$#%&!"#$ ) is sourced from 
Romali’s dataset and is described in detail in this section. This dataset also provides information 
about the US's Applied MFN tariffs (𝑡!""#$%&!"# ) for different years, which will be important to test 
whether preferential access has a meaningful effect in the US multilateral policy beyond its 
effects on the US MFN tariff bounds (𝑡!"#$%&!"# ). 
Importantly, Romali's dataset contains information that indicates the products that are 
eligible for tariff preferences under each PTA discussed above. Moreover, this dataset provides 
details of the official preferential tariffs (𝑡!""#$#%&!"#$ ) under all the five PTAs of interest. In the case 
of NAFTA, his dataset provides information about products originating in Mexico and Canada 
that should benefit from preferential access in the US market over the years. Though Romali’s 
dataset is essentially sourced from USITC website, it has been compiled and organized so as to 
provide information on applicable tariffs even where no trade is observed. This information is of 
great interest to us because it provides us information about US Applied MFN tariffs and the 
official preferential tariffs under the different PTAs. Notice that throughout this thesis we use the 
expression ‘official tariffs’ or ‘tariffs in the books’ interchangeably. 
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In Table 2.2, we use information obtained from Romali's dataset about the products that 
should benefit from preferential access to the US market. Notice, that this information 
corresponds to an indicator (binary) variable that provides no guarantee about the degree of 
market access or whether or not explicit or hidden barriers to trade apply to a particular product 
exported to the US from a particular region. Again, column 1 of Table 2.2, describes the different 
PTAs; column 2 gives the percentage of goods that are eligible to receive preferential treatment 
in the US market, according to US official statistics. 
Table 2.2: Percentage of goods receiving Preference 
PTA 
% of goods eligible to 
receive preference in 
books-'94 
ATPA'94 72 
CBI'94 73.1 
GSP'94 49.8 
ISRAEL'94 84.8 
NAFTA-CANADA'94 85.5 
NAFTA-MEXICO'94 99.4 
Source: author using data provided by Romali’s dataset 
Table 2.2 shows that bilateral trade programs like NAFTA and ISRAEL are more 
comprehensive (especially in terms of number of products that are eligible for preferential access 
to the US market) as compared to the unilateral trade programs like ATPA, CBI and GSP. We 
find that in the year of 1994 over 72 % of goods that could be imported to the US from the 
ATPA members qualified for preferential tariff under ATPA. About 85 % of goods from Israel 
officially qualified for preferential access to the US market under ISRAEL. For Canada and 
Mexico this figure was over 85 % and 99.4 % respectively under NAFTA.   
2.3 Data on the US Bound Tariffs and the US Applied Tariffs 
The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) website provides detailed data on the MFN 
tariff bounds (𝑡!"#$%&!"# ) set by each country on its imports. These MFN tariff bounds are 
negotiated amongst the member countries during each WTO round and are on an average 
expected to fall in order to achieve WTO’s aim of promoting freer trade among its member 
countries. We collect HTS 8 wise data on tariff bounds set by the US during both Tokyo round 
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and Uruguay round. In order to understand the trend and measure the tariff cuts by the US we 
calculated the absolute change in tariff bounds by taking the difference between Uruguay and 
Tokyo round tariffs. We then aggregated the data from the 8 digit level tariff lines to the 1 digit 
level and averaged out the difference in the US MFN tariff bounds between the two WTO rounds 
[(𝑈𝑟𝑢𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑦_𝑡!"#$%&!"# )   −   (𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑦𝑜_𝑡!"#$%&!"# )] at the one-digit industry levels. Notice, that Limão 
(2006) calculated this measure as ‘log (1+  𝑈𝑟𝑢𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑦_𝑡!"#$%&!"# ) −log (1+  𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑦𝑜_𝑡!"#$%&!"# )’.  
Graph 1, gives us the one digit industry levels (HTS 1) on ‘X’ axis. On ‘Y’ axis we have 
the MFN tariff bounds in percentage points.  
Graph 1: MFN Bound Tariffs set during WTO rounds 
 
Source: author using data provided by the WTO 
 Graph 1, shows the histogram for the US MFN tariff bounds aggregated at the one digit 
of the HTS level. The blue bars are the MFN tariff bounds set during Tokyo round and red bars 
are the MFN tariff bounds set during the Uruguay round. The data described in graph 1, suggests 
that the greatest drop in the US MFN bound tariffs between the two rounds of multilateral 
negotiation took place in industry 7 (stone, glass, metals and minerals) of one digit of the HTS 
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level corresponding to a total of approximately 58 %. This is followed closely by industry ‘9’ 
(medical or surgical instruments & accessories, arms and ammunitions, miscellaneous 
manufactured articles and services.) with a drop of 56 %. On an average there was a decrease of 
39 % in the US MFN tariff bounds negotiated between the two WTO rounds mentioned above. 
According to Etevadeordal et al. (2008), developing countries have high Applied tariffs 
and even higher MFN tariff bounds that creates a tariff overhang (difference between MFN tariff 
bound and the Applied tariffs). Therefore, it gives the developing countries a lot of freedom to 
adjust (increase or decrease) their Applied tariffs while staying well within their tariff bounds 
and following the WTO rules. The data of MFN bounds is easily available but does not usually 
change between the two WTO rounds. We believe that using Applied tariffs (which can be 
changed between the WTO rounds) though constraint by the MFN tariff bounds should still show 
a more crisp picture of how the PTAs affect the US tariffs. As mentioned previously, we sourced 
our data of Applied MFN tariffs from Romali’s dataset. Unfortunately, data back from early 
1980 was not available. So, to draw a parallel between the MFN bounds between the two WTO 
rounds and the Applied tariff for the same years was not possible. The earliest year for which 
such data is available is 1989. Therefore, we use the same, and show the comparison in the table 
below. 
 Column 1 of Table 2.3 shows the HTS 1 digit level.  Column 2 shows the average 
difference in the US tariff bounds set between the Uruguay round and the Tokyo round. Column 
3 shows the average difference in the Applied tariffs between the years '89 and '94. Since 
NAFTA was created in the same year and we know that the policy changes take time to come 
into effect, therefore, in column 4 we also present the average difference in the US Applied 
tariffs for year 89 and 96. Applied tariffs can also take time to adjust after the changes in bounds; 
this is an additional reason that makes this information crucial. We found that on an average the 
US Applied tariffs decreased between '89 and '96, a length of time that covers the formation of 
two of the most important PTAs in our dataset, NAFTA and ATPA. 
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Table 2.3: Average decline in MFN bounds and Applied Tariffs 
HTS 1 
Average 
tariff 
bound 
difference 
Average 
Applied tariff 
difference 
 ('94-'89) 
Average 
Applied tariff 
difference    
('96-'89) 
0 -1.7 -0.1 -0.7 
1 -1.7 0.0 -0.8 
2 -3.9 -0.7 -1.0 
3 -2.4 0.0 -0.6 
4 -1.7 0.0 -0.6 
5 -4.0 0.0 -0.7 
6 -3.1 0.0 -0.7 
7 -3.2 0.0 -0.8 
8 -1.6 0.0 -0.6 
9 -3.1 -0.1 -1.3 
Source: author using data provided by Romali’s dataset 
2.4 Creating binary variables:  
As discussed in sub-section 2.1, not all goods imported from the PTA members qualify 
for preferential access to the US market. Using the information provided in Romali’s data we 
first identify the goods that receive preferential access (PTA indicator- ‘I’) under a PTA (Table 
2.2, column 2). Limão identifies the products that are exported to the US under a PTA as 
products that receive preference (Limão, AER-2006). Therefore, we also create a binary variable 
‘Limao!"#’, as an equivalent to Limão’s (2006) binary variable that accounts for imports to the 
US under a PTA6.  Limao!"# = 1  𝑖𝑓  𝐼!"# > 0  &𝐶𝑉!"# > 0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  0     (2) 
(where, CV = customs (imported) value,  i = product code at HTS-8; j=ATPA, CBI, GSP, 
ISRAEL, NAFTA; t = 1994, 1996)   
Following Karacaovali & Limão (2008), only the products receiving full preferential 
access to the US market should create the stumbling block effect on the US multilateral tariff 
policy. When the US offers duty free access in a subset of products imported from certain 
developing countries, then these developing countries benefit by facing lower tariffs than their 
                                                
6 Limao! that we create is equal to ‘G!’ of Limao (2006), (see section II of Limao (2006)) 
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competitors. Also, when the PTA is signed, the member countries value it at given multilateral 
tariffs. Therefore, if the US decreases or eliminates its multilateral tariffs on the same subset of 
goods then it would effectively diminish the preference (Margin) it valued before. We define 
‘Margin’ as follows: 
  𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛!"# = 𝑡!!!"#$%!"# !" − 𝑡!""#$#%&!"#$ !"#      (3) 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙  𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛!"# = 𝑡!""#$%&!"# !" − 𝑡!"#$!%!"#$ !"#          (4) 
 (where,  i = product code at HTS-8;  j = ATPA, CBI, GSP, ISRAEL, NAFTA; t = 1994, 1996)   
 Alternatively, if there exists a positive official preferential tariff (𝑡!""#$#%&!"#$ ) then there is 
scope of reducing the same in conjunction with the Applied MFN tariffs (𝑡!""#$%&!"# ) without 
actually eroding the preference margins of the PTA members and hence avoiding any resistance 
(stumbling block effect) from them if the US decides to lower its MFN tariffs, (Karacaovali & 
Limão-2008). In addition, there has to be a positive Applied MFN tariff (𝑡!""#$%&!"# ) on products 
imported from PTA members, because if the Applied MFN tariff is zero then there is essentially 
no preference granted. Furthermore, we should have positive imports (CV>0) for that product to 
cause any effect on multilateral trade policies of the US on the whole. 
As discussed previously only the products getting full preferential access to the US 
should create a ‘stumbling block effect’. But this difference between full preferential access and 
partial preferential access is unaccounted for in Limão’s (2006) calculations. From our data set 
we wanted to identify only the products that were imported in the US from the PTA members 
and enjoyed full preference in books. We use official preferences and preferences in books 
interchangeably in our description. Thus, as compared to Limão’s binary variable (Limao!"#), we 
created a more specific and relevant binary variable (𝐵!"#) that would account for all these above-
mentioned conditions.  𝐵!"# = 1  𝑖𝑓𝑡!""#$%&!"# !"   > 0  &  𝐼!"# > 0  &    𝑡!""#$#%&!"#$   !"# = 0  &  𝐶𝑉!"# > 0;     𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  0 (5) 
(where, i = product code at HTS-8; j=ATPA, CBI, GSP, ISRAEL, NAFTA; t = 1994, 1996)   
 
  
16 
As mentioned previously (sub-section 2.1) the presence of tariffs or hidden barriers to 
trade (export ceilings, rules of origin, administrative costs) may create discrepancy between the 
official and actual preferences granted to the beneficiary countries. Anson et al. (2005) show that 
‘the rules of origin virtually limit the market access that PTA’s confer to southern partners. In 
case of NAFTA, the average compliance cost is around 6 % of ad valorem undoing the Tariff 
preference (4 % on average) for a large number of tariff lines. Administrative costs amount to 47 
% of the preference margin.’  
So, to address this issue we generated a binary variable that captures the products with 
large margin  (𝐵𝐿!"#) that would identify the products that have meaningful margins (greater than 
3 %) in their preferential tariffs. Moreover, these are products with economically important 
margin, as shown by Etevadeordal et al. (2008). The potential effect of significant preferential 
margins is ambiguous. On one hand, Estevadeordal et al. (2008) show that products with 
important margins and significant exports tend to generate a building block effect on the 
multilateral trade policy of Latin American countries. On the other, it is possible that products 
with significant margins may represent exactly the cases of meaningful preferential access where 
the stumbling block effect is most pervasive. We describe products with significant official 
preferential margins as follows,    𝐵𝐿!"# = 1  𝑖𝑓  𝑡!""#$%&!"# !" > 0  &  𝐼!"# > 0  &      𝑡!""#$#%&!"#$ !"# = 0  &  𝐶𝑉!"# >       0  &     𝑡!""#$%&!"# !" −   𝑡!""#$#%&!"#$ !"# > 0.03  ; 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  0        (6) 
(where, i = product code at HTS-8; j=ATPA, CBI, GSP, ISRAEL, NAFTA; t = 1994, 1996)   
Since, official preferential tariffs (in the books) are often different form actual 
preferential tariffs, we created the following two binary variables (𝐴!"  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐴𝐿!") similar as 
equation (5) and (6) but using Actual preferential tariffs (𝑡!"#$!%!"#$ ) instead of official preferential 
tariffs    (𝑡!""#$#%&!"#$ ). Equation (1) shows how we compute the Actual preferential tariffs using the 
data described in sub-section 2.1. Actual preferential tariffs show a picture of preferential tariffs 
that is closer to reality since it is essentially the outcome of the preference granted under the 
PTAs discussed above along with the hidden barriers to trade that diminishes the benefit to the 
member countries  (administrative costs, Rules of origin etc.). We also control for noise in the 
data and capture the products with actual preferential tariffs less than or equal to 0.001.  
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𝐴!"# = 1  𝑖𝑓  𝑡!""#$%&!"# !" > 0  &  𝐼!"# > 0  &  0 ≤ 𝑡!"#$!%!"#$ !"# ≤ 0.001  &  𝐶𝑉!"# > 0;     𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  0      (7)   
(where i = product code at HTS-8; j=ATPA, CBI, GSP, ISRAEL, NAFTA; t = 1994, 1996)   
 
 𝐴𝐿!"# = 1  𝑖𝑓  𝑡!""#$%&!"# !" > 0  &  𝐼!"# > 0  &  0 ≤ 𝑡!"#$!%!"#$ !"# ≤ 0.001  &  𝐶𝑉!"# > 0  &   𝑡!""#$%&!"# !" − 𝑡!"#$!%!"#$ !"# > 0.03  ; 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  0                           (8) 
(where, i = product code at HTS-8; j=ATPA, CBI, GSP, ISRAEL, NAFTA; t = 1994, 1996)   
The results from these binary variables(𝐵!"# ,𝐵𝐿!"#𝐴!"#  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐴𝐿!"#) are shown in Table 2.4 
below. For the year 1994, we have information on over 8,600 products in our dataset, which we 
use to compute these binary variables. Column one gives the name of the PTAs. Column two 
(𝐵!"#) gives us the percentage of products that face a positive MFN tariff (𝑡!""#$%&!"#  > 0) in the US 
market, are officially qualified to receive preferences under a specific PTA program for 
importing to the US (  𝐼!" > 0), the preference granted in books is full i.e. (𝑡!""#$#%&!!"# = 0) and 
there were some imports (Custom Value of imports > 0) in this category of products (HTS 8) in 
the year 1994. We found that the fraction of products that receive full preferences in the books    
(𝐵!"#) was smallest for ATPA’94 at less than 13 % and largest for NAFTA’94 at over 50 % 
Column three (𝐵𝐿!"#) gives us a subset of column two and contains the products that fulfill an 
additional condition that the official margin of preference is greater than three percentage points 
(𝑡!""#$%&!"# − 𝑡!""#$#%&!"#$ > 0.03). We found that the fraction of products that receive full preferences 
in the books and have a meaningful margin (𝐵𝐿!"#), was smallest for ATPA’94 at 10 % and 
again largest for NAFTA’94 at a little less than 39 %. 
 Column four describes the average value for the binary variable ‘𝐴!"#’ by PTA sponsored 
by the US. It shows the percentage of products that have a positive MFN tariff  (𝑡!""#$%&!"#  > 0), are 
officially qualified to receive preference under a specific PTA program for importing to the US 
(  𝐼!" > 0), after controlling for noise, the actual preference granted is full i.e.  (0 ≤ 𝑡!"#$!%!"#$ ≤0.001) and there were some imports (Custom Value of imports >0) in this category in the year 
1994. We found that fraction of products that receive full actual preferences (𝐴!"#), was the 
smallest for ATPA’94 at 9 % and largest for ISRAEL’94 at 17.6 %. Column five (𝐴𝐿!"#) gives 
us a subset of column four and gives us the percentage of products that also fulfills an additional 
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condition that the actual margin of preference is large (𝑡!""#$%&!"# − 𝑡!"#$!%!"#$ )   > 0.03).  We found 
that the fraction of products that get full actual preference with meaningful margins (𝐴𝐿!"#) was 
the smallest for GSP’94 at 6.5 % and the largest for Israel’94 at 14.7 %. 
Table 2.4: Percentage of products that receive preferences in Books and in Actual 
Binary Variable/ 
PTA’94 
% of products with full preference Limao!"# 𝐵!"# 𝐵𝐿!"# 𝐴!"# 𝐴𝐿!"# 
ATPA’94 12.7 10.0 9 6.9 13.1 
CBI’94 17.2 13.6 11.7 9.1 17.6 
GSP’94 39.1 30.3 9.9 6.5 39.1 
ISRAEL’94 21.0 17.6 17.6 14.7 23.4 
NAFTA’94 50.3 38.8 16.6 11.1 78.8 
Source: author using data provided by Romali’s dataset and USIT website 
 The table above gives us some important insights on the significance and coverage of the 
PTA programs under discussion. We found that for ATPA’94, slightly less than 13 % of 
products from over 8,600 products that the member countries export to the US officially enjoy 
full preference.  But only 10 % of the total products officially get meaningful (greater than at 
least 3 %) preferential margins. As discussed before the trade barriers (like rules of origin and 
administrative costs) are high for imports via a PTA, therefore importing via a PTA is beneficial 
only if there is a substantial margin (𝑡!""#$%&!"# _− 𝑡!""#$#%&!"#$ ). About 9 % of goods imported via 
ATPA’94 actually get full preferential access to the US market. We found that only about 6.9 % 
of the products actually earn a meaningful actual preferential margin (𝑡!""#$%&!"# _− 𝑡!"#$!%!"#$ )   >0.03).  
Column six shows the percentage of products that get preference (full preference or 
partial preference) according to the definition used in Limão (2006). Notice that he considers all 
the products that are exported to the US (Custom Value of imports >0) under a PTA  (  𝐼!"# > 0). 
According to Limão (2006) 78.8 % of products imported in the US from the NAFTA member 
countries receive preferential access. A little over 13 % of products imported from the ATPA 
countries receive preferential access to the US market. As discussed above, these are not 
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necessarily full preferences since there is no control for the same in his definition of the binary 
variable (Limao!"#) 
We calculated the same binary variables for the year 1996 and found that 𝐴𝐿!" decreased 
for all the programs, except for NAFTA where we observed a marginal increase. Please see 
Appendix B, Table B-1 for percentage of goods that fulfill the conditions for the above-
mentioned binary variables (𝐵!"# ,𝐵𝐿!"#𝐴!"#  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐴𝐿!"#) for the year 1996. The increase in 
NAFTA could be attributed to the fact that NAFTA came into force in 1994 and therefore with 
the passage of time more products qualified for full preferential access with meaningful margins 
in the US market. The decrease in  (𝐴𝐿!"#) for the rest of the PTAs could be because of the 
hidden barriers to trade that eroded the meaningful (greater than 3 %) preferential margins.  
Furthermore, we created several variables to compare the stumbling block effect between 
different set of products and to see their individual effect on an average. In Limão (2006), the 
stumbling block effect is calculated for the group of products that receive any type of preference 
(full or partial) under a PTA. Also, the stumbling block effect is found to be comparatively 
stronger if the product receives full or partial preference under all the PTAs. Limão (2006) found 
60 % larger effect in the group of products that receive preference in all PTAs as compared to the 
group of products that receive preferences under some but not all PTA. Karacaovali and Limão 
(2008), found that the tariff reduction from the goods that get partial preference (positive 
preferential tariff) is identical to non PTA goods. Following the intuition from these papers we 
decided to study if only the products that get full preference in the US market cause the 
stumbling block effect. Also, whether the effect is different for the products that get full 
preferences in some PTA as against all PTAs. Therefore, we first created the union of individual 
PTA variables to estimate the average stumbling block effect. 
 
a).  “ANYPTABook”:  𝐵!" = 1  𝑖𝑓  𝐵!"# = 1  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑎𝑛𝑦  𝑗;   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  0                        (9) 
In simple words  “ANYPTABook” is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 only if a 
product gets full preference in books under one or more PTA. In our dataset, 61.4 % of the 
products receive full preferential access according to official tariffs in the US market through at 
least one of the described PTAs. We generated the intersection of individual PTAs, 
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“EVERPTABook”, which is a binary variable that takes the value of one, if a product gets full 
preference in books under all PTAs. It accounts for 3.86 % of the total goods in our dataset.  
b). “EVERYPTABook”:  𝐸𝑉𝐵!" = 1  𝑖𝑓  𝐵!"# = 1  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑎𝑙𝑙  𝑗;   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  0                                  (10) 
We revisit Karacaovali and Limão (2008) results using our data on US imports. 
Therefore, we created “ParANYPTABook” which is 1 for the group of products that get partial 
preferences under any PTA.7 In my dataset, less than 18 % of the products receive partial 
preferential access according to official tariffs in the US market through at least one of the 
described PTAs. This variable will help us gauge the stumbling block effect caused by goods that 
get partial preference in books. 
c).  “ParANYPTABook”:  𝑃𝐵!" = 1  𝑖𝑓  Limao!"# = 1    &  𝐵!"# = 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑎𝑛𝑦  𝑗;   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  0     (11) 
 Estevadeordal et al. (2008) found that ‘for goods with a meaningful margin, higher 
preference shares lead to deeper MFN tariff reductions.’ Their study based on the data from 10 
Latin American countries reflected a clear tariff complementarity (an increase in the preference 
margin leads to future reduction in Applied MFN tariffs) effect in FTAs but not for CU. In their 
analysis if preferences are greater that 2.5 %, then it was considered as meaningful preference 
margin. They also found that tariffs on goods with meaningful preference margins tend to fall 
faster for FTAs.  With an intention to explore our data for US imports on the same lines we 
created binary variables: “ANYPTABooklarge” and “LargeExportsandMarginBook”.   
 We consider preference margins greater than 3 % as meaningful margins large enough to 
qualify for “ANYPTABooklarge”.8 We basically, created a union of individual PTA variable 
with meaningful margins (greater than 3 %) to estimate the average stumbling block effect from 
the products that receive large margins under all PTAs. It accounts for 48.05 % of products in 
our dataset. 
d). “ANYPTABooklarge”- 𝐵𝐿!" = 1  𝑖𝑓  𝐵𝐿!"# = 1  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑎𝑛𝑦  𝑗;   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  0         (12) 
                                                
7 On the same lines we created the following binary variables to measure the stumbling block effect from goods 
getting partial preferences in every PTA in books. In my dataset less than 0.5 % of the products receive partial 
preferential access according to official tariffs in the US market through all of the PTAs under consideration (See 
Appendix B, Table-B-3). 
8 To control for endogeniety of 𝐵𝐿!" we constructed a new IV: 𝐵𝐿78!"(see appendix B, Table B-3 for details). 
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 “LargeExportsandMarginBook” consists of products that receive full preferences in any 
PTA in the books with meaningful margins (greater than 3 %) and have large export volume, 
(HI_EX =1 if export value of good ‘i’ from each given PTA exceeds the mean export value of 
that PTA to the US in all goods).9 It accounts for 6.81 % of the total products in our dataset. 
e).  “LargeExportsandMarginBook”: 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝐵!"= 1 if 𝐵𝐿!" = 1  and 𝐻𝐼_𝐸𝑋=1        (13) 
On the same lines we also created an intersection of individual PTA variable with 
meaningful margins (greater than 3 %) to estimate the average stumbling block effect from the 
products that receive large margins under all PTAs. In our dataset, 3.17 % of the products 
receive preferential access to the US market with meaningful margins under all of the above-
mentioned PTAs. 
f). “EVERYPTABookLarge”:  𝐸𝑉𝐵𝐿!" = 1  𝑖𝑓  𝐵𝐿!"# = 1  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑎𝑙𝑙  𝑗;   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  0                   (14) 
MFN tariff bounds and MFN Applied tariff are not the same. Estevadeordal et al. (2008) 
use MFN Applied tariffs in their analysis of PTAs affect trade liberalization in case of Latin 
American countries. Like them, we also intend to analyze the effect of full preferences in books 
in the presence of tariff bounds that constrain the Applied tariffs in case of the US. Therefore, for 
the year 1994, we first created bind!"!. Then we created an interaction variable, for the group of 
products that get full preferences in books and are also bound by MFN tariff bounds 
g).  bind_94! =1 if 𝑡𝑎𝑟_𝑢𝑟𝑦! <= AppliedT_MFN94!+.05          (15) 
(where i = product code at HTS-8) 
h).  ANYPTABookbind: 𝐵𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑94  !=  𝐵!*bind_94!           (16) 
(where i = product code at HTS-8) 
As mentioned previously in our discussion, the actual tariffs may not be the same as the 
official tariffs.  We believe the difference between the two is important and further analysis 
should provide some new insights. Therefore, we went ahead and created parallel binary 
variables for all of the above-mentioned variables using actual tariffs, instead of official tariffs. 
                                                
9 We borrow  HI_EX from Limão (2006). 
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(Appendix B, Table B-2 contains the explanation of all the binary variables created using Actual 
tariffs).  
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Chapter 3 - Econometric Model 
In this chapter, we describe the econometric model for analyzing the effects of PTAs on 
the US multilateral tariff policies. Since our motivation for this study came from Limão (2006), 
we begin by first describing his model. Then, we proceed by describing our econometric model 
and discussing the difference between the two approaches. Our benchmark model is Limão 
(2006), and though our basic framework is similar, we describe several variables differently than 
him. This means that we use several controls on our variables that our data suggest are important 
and could give a biased result if ignored. 
3.1 Limão’s Strategy 
Linear approximation of Limão’s (2006) empirical model is given as follows: 𝜏!" = ∅𝐺!𝑍! + ∅!𝑍! + ∅!𝐺! +   𝛼! + 𝛼! + 𝛼!" + 𝛽 𝑏! − 𝑏!! + −𝜌 ∗𝑚𝑎!! 1!! + 𝜀!"      (17)  
where i=1… N and t=1, 2           
Where,  𝜏!" is a measure of the US MFN-bound ad valorem tariff rate negotiated in period 
t on product  𝑖. The indicator 𝐺! denotes whether 𝑖 is exported to the US under a PTA and 𝑍!   is 
equal to one after the PTA and zero before it.   A positive  ∅ means an increase in the US MFN 
tariff on PTA goods relative to non-PTA goods. Limão controls for several factors to ensure, that 
the MFN tariffs of non-PTA goods provide a reasonable counterfactual for the MFN tariffs of 
PTA goods. He controls for all unobserved product characteristics through a full set of product 
dummies:  𝛼!. Furthermore, 𝛼!" in his model controls for all time-varying unobserved 
characteristics (e.g., import penetration, labor intensity, and lobbying strength of domestic 
industries versus their foreign counterparts) of the group of goods  𝑖 in each industry I during 
period t. The last two variables (𝛽 𝑏! − 𝑏!! 1!!   &   −𝜌 ∗𝑚𝑎!! 1!!) respectively control for 
bargaining and reciprocity effects related to multilateral trade negotiations, which vary over time 
and products.  
In the next step, Limão (2006) relaxes the symmetry assumption of the theoretical model 
and allows for multiple non-PTA countries to negotiate multilaterally with the US. He controls 
for any indirect effects on the US MTL that arises from other countries changing their MTL. In 
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the equation above, 1!! indicates whether country k exports good- i to the US and therefore, the 
last two variables in his model exhibit product variation (since each country k exports different 
sets of goods). These variables measure two important determinants of tariff changes during 
multilateral negotiations: the US bargaining power relative to country k and product tariff 
reciprocity. He initially assumes that the US is negotiating with a single country, k, and then 
generalizes this to multiple countries below. He takes the difference across the last two 
multilateral rounds to describe bargaining and reciprocity in his model. This eliminates the 
unobserved product characteristics (𝛼!) that we assume, remain constant over time and also 
account for market access concession. 
             ∆𝜏!" = ∅𝐺! + ∅! + ∆  𝛼! + ∆𝛼!" + 𝛽∆ 𝑏! − 𝑏!! 1!! + −𝜌 ∗ ∆𝑚𝑎!! 1!! + 𝜀!"     (18) 
 where i=1… N and t=1, 2         
Limão uses relative GDP changes as a broad proxy for changes in bargaining power of an 
economy across rounds. He proposes that, relative economic size is crucial and conditional on 
the other variables. The idea is that a particular country k exporting good i is expected to obtain a 
relatively larger cut in the US tariff if, when comparing across the two trade rounds, either of the 
following holds: (a) country k is relatively better prepared for the negotiation, perhaps because it 
has more resources to dedicate to it; (b) k imports more of the US goods such that it has 
relatively high market power. His prediction is that an increase in k' s bargaining power relative 
to the US, as proxied by a fall in the log difference of GDP in the US and country k, 𝑏! − 𝑏!! , 
causes the US to lower its tariff in the goods exported by k, i.e.,  𝛽 > 0. 
He takes into account a potentially important determinant of differential liberalization 
across products, i.e. reciprocity-the extent to which the US reduces its tariffs by more when its 
partners offer larger tariff reductions. Reciprocity in multilateral negotiations is typically sought 
in first-differences (Bhagwati, 1991), i.e., negotiators focus on changes in protection as opposed 
to their level; these are often called market access concessions. If product reciprocity is followed, 
then the larger the aggregate market access concession k offers to the US, i.e., the larger ∆𝑚𝑎!! in 
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(18) is, the larger the US tariff reduction, -∆𝜏!", is on the products exported by k. Thus, if 
reciprocity is an important element in multilateral negotiation, we expect that, 𝜌 > 0. 10 
  Limão expresses the aggregate change in k's market access as ∆𝑚𝑎!!=𝛴!(−∆𝜏!"! )𝑤!"! , 
where −∆𝜏!"!   is the percentage tariff reduction by k in each imported good j. For a given weight, 
larger reductions by k increase market access for the US and so, if negotiators reciprocate, then it 
leads to a lower US tariff in each good i that k exports to the US. 
 Limão addresses the issue of multiple exporters for any good i to the US as follows. 
According to the principal supplier rule in the GATT, countries negotiate only with the top 
exporters; so he aggregates the observations for each good i in (18) over its principal suppliers to 
the US using their individual export value as a share of their total value exported to the US, 𝑠!"! . 
Using this and the derived market access expression above, he wrote (18) in terms of estimable 
coefficients as 
               ∆𝜏!" = ∅𝐺! + 𝑎 + 𝑎! + 𝛽𝛴!𝑠!"! ∆ 𝑏! − 𝑏!! + 𝜌𝛴!𝑠!"! (𝛴!∆𝜏!"!𝑤!"! )+ 𝑢!         (19) 
where,  i=1… N and t=1, 2           
Where 𝑎 denotes an intercept that estimates the average MFN tariff change for the excluded 
industry (miscellaneous manufacturing); and  𝑎!, represents the set of included industry dummies. 
He estimates (19) and tests if ∅ is positive. Moreover, if bargaining power and reciprocity are 
important determinants of multilateral tariff settings, then he expects 𝛽 and 𝜌 to be positive. 
3.2 Proposed model 
With Limão (2006) as our benchmark model we proceed by redefining some of his key 
variables and then incorporate the newly defined variables in his model.  As discussed previously 
(Subsection 2.4, equation 2), Limão (2006) identifies products that get preference and are 
exported to the US under a PTA (Limao!"#).  The indicator 𝐺! in equation 17 denotes whether 
product - 𝑖 is exported to the US under a PTA. Essentially,  Limao!  (i=1…N) that we calculated is 
same as 𝐺!  (i=1…N) of Limão (2006).  In the same section, we reason and introduce the binary 
variable 𝐵!"#(equation 9) that is equal to 1 for the products that receive full preferential access in 
                                                
10 We may expect to find product reciprocity because, in the UR, negotiators used a product-by-product approach 
rather than agreeing to reduce tariffs across the board according to a formula (Bernard M. Hoekman and Michel M. 
Kostecki, 2001, p. 133). 
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books under a PTA, have positive MFN tariff and are exported to the US, otherwise zero. We 
borrow Limão’s (2006) econometric model and replace his binary variable that identifies goods 
that get preference (𝐺!) with a more relevant and stringent binary variable 𝐵!. Hence, our 
equivalent linear approximation of Limão (2006) model is: 𝜏!" = ∅𝐵!𝑍! + ∅!𝑍! + ∅!𝐵! +   𝛼! + 𝛼! + 𝛼!" + 𝛽 𝑏! − 𝑏!! + −𝜌 ∗𝑚𝑎!! 1!! + 𝜀!" (20) 
where, i=1… N and t=1, 2          
Where,  𝜏!" is a measure of the US MFN-bound ad valorem tariff rate negotiated in period 
t on product  𝑖. The indicator 𝐵! denotes whether i is exported to the US under a PTA, receives 
full preference in the books and the MFN tariff on this product is positive. 𝑍!   is equal to one 
after the PTA and zero before it.   A positive  ∅ means an increase in the US MFN tariff on PTA 
goods relative to ‘non-PTA goods’11. Like Limão, we also control for several factors to ensure 
that the MFN tariffs of non-PTA goods provide a reasonable counterfactual for the MFN tariffs 
of PTA goods. We use Limão’s (2006) control for all unobserved product characteristics through 
a full set of product dummies:  𝛼!. Furthermore, 𝛼!" in the model controls for all time-varying 
unobserved characteristics (e.g., import penetration, labor intensity, and lobbying strength of 
domestic industries versus their foreign counterparts) of the group of goods  𝑖 in each industry I 
during period: t. The last two variables (𝛽 𝑏! − 𝑏!! 1!!   &   −𝜌 ∗𝑚𝑎!! 1!!) respectively control for 
bargaining and reciprocity effects related to multilateral trade negotiations, which vary over time 
and products.  
We follow his steps and take difference across the last two multilateral rounds to describe 
bargaining and reciprocity in the model. This eliminates the unobserved product characteristics 
(𝛼!) that we assume, remain constant over time and also account for market access concession. 
     ∆𝜏!" = ∅𝐵! + ∅! + ∆  𝛼! + ∆𝛼!" + 𝛽∆ 𝑏! − 𝑏!! 1!! + −𝜌 ∗ ∆𝑚𝑎!! 1!! + 𝜀!"       (21) 
where,  i=1… N and t=1, 2           
 We borrow Limão’s expression for the aggregate change in k's market access as ∆𝑚𝑎!!=𝛴!(−∆𝜏!"! )  𝑤!"! , where −∆𝜏!"!   is the percentage tariff reduction by k in each imported good 
                                                
11 In reference to our model ‘non-PTA goods’ represent the goods that do not receive full preferential access to the 
US market. (i.e. goods that do not receive any preference plus the goods that receive only partial preferences). 
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j. For a given weight, larger reductions by k increase market access for the US and so, if 
negotiators reciprocate, then it leads to a lower US tariff in each good i that k exports to the US. 
To address the issue of multiple exporters for any good i to the US we use Limão’s 
(2006) approach described in the previous section. Using Limão’s 𝑠!"!  and his derived market 
access expression above, we write (12) in terms of estimable coefficients as 
      ∆𝜏!" = ∅𝐵! + 𝑎 + 𝑎! + 𝛽𝛴!𝑠!"! ∆ 𝑏! − 𝑏!! + 𝜌𝛴!𝑠!"! (𝛴!∆𝜏!"!𝑤!"! )+ 𝑢!   (22) 
where, i=1… N and t=1, 2          
Where 𝑎  denotes an intercept that estimates the average MFN tariff change for the excluded 
industry (miscellaneous manufacturing); and  𝑎!, represents the set of included industry dummies. 
We estimate (22) and test if ∅ is positive. Also, if bargaining power and reciprocity are important 
determinants of multilateral tariff settings, then he expects 𝛽 and 𝜌 to be positive. 
To check for the stumbling block effect from the group of products that receive partial 
preferences under any PTA in the US market we follow the approach of Karacaovali & Limão 
(2008). We estimate equation 22 with slight modification. We use ‘𝐺!’ (same as in Limão 
(2006)) instead of ‘𝐵!’and an additional explanatory variable ‘ 𝑃𝐵!’.  The variable ‘𝐺!’ takes the 
value of one if i is exported to the US under a PTA (includes both full and partial preferences). 
Whereas, 𝑃𝐵! is one for the subset of goods exported to the US with only partial preferential 
tariff (equation 11). We also conduct a formal test of summation in which the sum of these 
coefficients measures the total effect of goods with partial preferential tariff.  
Since, we also want to investigate the stumbling block effect for actual tariffs, we also 
introduce the binary variable 𝐴!"# (equation 7) which takes the value 1 for the products that 
actually receive full preferential access under a PTA, have positive MFN tariff and is exported to 
the US. For all other products 𝐴!"# is zero.  Therefore, we also estimate: 
     ∆𝜏!" = ∅𝐴! + 𝑎 + 𝑎! + 𝛽𝛴!𝑠!!! ∆ 𝑏! − 𝑏!! + 𝜌𝛴!𝑠!"! (𝛴!∆𝜏!"!𝑤!"! )+ 𝑢!     (23) 
where,  i=1… N and t = 1, 2 
         Till now we were measuring the stumbling block effect from various group of products on 
the US MFN bounds. As discussed previously there is a difference between the MFN bound 
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tariffs and the Applied Tariffs. We check for the stumbling block effect from the group of 
products that receive full preferences in books or in actual under any PTA on the US Applied 
tariffs. For this we estimate equation 22, but with ‘∆𝐴𝜏!"’ as the explained variable instead of ∆𝜏!" (difference in the US MFN tariff bounds). Where,  ‘∆𝐴𝜏!"’ represents the difference in the 
US Applied tariffs (year 1996-year 1989). The explanatory and variables remain the same12 for 
book and actual respectively. 
  
                                                
12 We drop the reciprocity variable from the regression while estimating the effect of PTAs on the US Applied 
tariffs. 
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Chapter 4 – Estimates 
We present the econometric results in 6 different tables.  Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 
present the changes in the US MFN tariff bounds while Tables 4.5 and 4.6 present the changes in 
the US MFN Applied tariffs. The mean reduction in the US tariff (Bounds and Applied) is 
presented in Appendix B, Table B-5. Results in Tables 4.1, 4.3 and 4.5 are based on official 
tariffs while results in Tables 4.2, 4.4 and 4.6 are based on actual tariffs. First, we consider the 
effects of products with full preferential access on the change in MFN tariff bounds both in 
absolute terms and relative to products with partial preferential access in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. In 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4, we consider the effects of products with large margin and large export 
participation as well as the effects of full preferential access across different preferential 
programs. Finally, in Tables 4.5 and 4.6, we focus on the effects of full preferential access on 
Applied MFN tariffs. 
4.1 Book: Preferences under all PTAs versus preferences under some but not all 
PTAs and full preference versus partial preferences 
In column 1 and 2 of Table 4.1, we estimate equation-22 using ordinary least square 
(OLS) and an instrumental variable approach respectively. While, columns 3 and 4 consider 
whether products with full official preferences in all PTAs differ from products with full 
preferential access in some PTAs only. Columns 5 and 6 consider the effects of full preferences 
relative to partial preferential access in books. The OLS results are shown in columns 1, 3 and 5 
of Table 4.1. Columns 2, 4 and 6 of Table 4.1 have different specifications where we use GMM 
estimator and instrument for endogenous variables. All specifications include the same two digits 
of the harmonized standard industry dummies used in Limão (2006). 
In column 1, the coefficient of 𝐵!   (ANYPTABook), is 1.084. We find that products 
receiving full preferential access to the US markets have a statistically significant stumbling 
block effect. The OLS estimation in column 1 may be biased due to presence of endogeniety. 
Thus, we also present and discuss the IV regression of column 1 in column 2. The estimate for 
the coefficient on 𝐵!, ∅ in column two is 1.812; it is positive and statistically significant. 
Therefore, we find that products receiving full preferential access in books to the US markets 
have a statistically significant stumbling block effect on MFN tariff bounds.  
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In column 3, we check if the magnitude of the stumbling block effect varies over 
different goods depending on whether all PTA partners under consideration, as against some but 
not all PTA partners, export it to the US with full preferential access13.  In column 3, the 
coefficient of the variable 𝐵!   suggests that products that receive full preferential access in some 
PTAs have a stumbling block effect. The coefficient of 𝐸𝑉𝐵! (EVRPTAbook94) is not 
statistically significant.  From the test of the sum of the coefficients for 𝐵!   𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑉𝐵!, we reject 
the null hypothesis. These results imply that, the products that receive full preferential access in 
books under all PTAs have a stumbling block effect that is identical to the stumbling block effect 
of products that receive full preferential access in books under some PTAs but not all.   
Following the same logic that due to endogeniety we might have a bias in the OLS 
regression in column 3, so we present IV approach for the same in column 4.  We found that the 
coefficient of 𝐵!   suggests a stumbling block effect for goods that receive full preferential access 
to US market under some PTAs. Coefficient of 𝐸𝑉𝐵! is 0.470 and statistically not significant. 
From the test of summation test of 𝐵!   𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑉𝐵!, we reject the null hypothesis. We found that the 
stumbling block effect from products that get full preferences in books under all PTAs is 
identical to the stumbling block effect from products that get full preferences in books under 
some but not all PTAs.   
Columns 5 and 6 investigate whether goods that receive partial rather than full 
preferential access cause any effect on multilateral tariff changes. The intuition from Karacaovali 
and Limão (2008) suggests that only products receiving full preferences should generate a 
stumbling block effect.14 We use the same variable as Limão (2006) uses for representing the 
group of products that receive full or partial preferences under any PTA (anypta9415). In column 
5, we use an OLS approach while in column 6 we use an IV-GMM approach. The coefficient of 
“anypta94” maintains a stumbling block effect and is significant. The sign of coefficient of 𝑃𝐵!(partialprefanybook) is negative and it is significant. From the summation test of 
                                                
13 The econometric model used in columns 3 and 4 is similar to the model used by Karacaovali and Limão (2008) 
for the case of European Union (EU). See column 2 of Table 2 of their paper. Limão (2006) follows similar 
modelling strategy but does not distinguish between full or partial prefrences. See Table 2 , columns 2 and 4 of their 
paper. 
14  The choice of variables to investigate this issue follows the paper by Karacaovali and Limão (2008) about the 
effects of preferential treatment in the EU’s multilateral policy. See column 2 of Table 3 in their paper. In Table 4.2 
we consider actual full preferences , something not considered in Karacaovali and Limão (2008). 
15 ‘anypta94’ is same as ‘ANYPTA’ in Limao(2006), (see Table 1A, Data Discription of Limao(2006)) 
 
  
31 
“anypta94” and 𝑃𝐵! we reject the null hypothesis. Moreover, the coefficient of the sum is 
positive. This means that both goods with full preferences in books under any PTA and with 
partial preferences in books under any PTA have a stumbling block effect but the effect of the 
former is greater than the effect of the latter (1.388-0.818). 
In column 6 we found that coefficient of “anypta94” is positive and significant. The sign 
of coefficient  of  𝑃𝐵!  is negative and significant. From the formal test we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis and conclude that on an average only products with full preferences under any PTA 
seem to cause a stumbling block effect using the official tariffs (book). This is in line with 
Karacaovali and Limão (2008) that conclude that partial preferences do not generate a stumbling 
block effect on MFN tariff bounds. 
In our analysis16 we found that products that get full preferences in books under any PTA 
show stumbling block effect.  Our results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.1 are in line with 
Limão’s (2006) results. The coefficient of 𝐵! from column 2 (1.812) means that on an average 
the drop in US MFN tariff bounds on the products that receive full preferences in books is 1.8 
percentage points less as compared to non PTA goods (good that do not receive full preferences). 
On the other hand, our estimates for 𝐵! and 𝐸𝑉𝐵! do not support the theory, that if a product 
receives full preferences in books under all of the above mentioned PTAs, then the stumbling 
block effect should be stronger, as compared to the products that receive full preferences under 
some PTAs but not all.  In fact, columns 3 and 4 of table 4.1 show that we found no difference in 
the stumbling block effect generated from these two set of products. Our estimates from the OLS 
regression in column 5 contradict the results of Karacaovali and Limão (2008) and we found that 
the products receiving partial preferences in books under any PTA also have a stumbling block 
effect, though this effect is smaller than the products that get full preferences in books under any 
PTA. However, the IV regression in column 6 supports the results of Karacaovali and Limão 
(2008). We found that on average only products with full preferences in books cause a stumbling 
block effect on the MFN bound tariffs.  Our instruments also pass IV tests (Hansen J and K-P) 
making these results reliable.  
                                                
16 We borrow our IVs from Limão (2006). We report only a few instruments like BARPOW, NTB, DS etc here (See 
Table 1A, Limao (2006) for details). 
We also constructed new IVs to control for the endogeniety that could be caused by the variables we created (See 
Appendix B, Table B-3). 
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Table 4.1: Estimates of Stumbling Block and Multilateral Negotiation Effects: Preferences in 
book-full, Partial, any PTA and every PTA 
Dependent variable:  
 Tariff diff (Δτ) 
OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 𝐵! (∅) 1.084 1.812 1.085 1.791 
  
 
(0.140) (0.469) (0.140) (0.464) 
  anypta94 
    
1.388 2.174 
     
(0.229) (0.390) 𝑃𝐵! 
    
-0.818 -2.846 
     
(0.171) (0.875) 𝐸𝑉𝐵! 
  
-0.011 0.470 
  
   
(0.151) (0.290) 
  BARPOW (β) 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
TOTLIB (ρ) -0.003 0.018 -0.003 0.017 -0.003 0.016 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
TOT*NTB -0.014 -0.080 -0.014 -0.078 -0.015 -0.077 
 
(0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) 
NTB -0.895 -4.193 -0.895 -4.106 -1.009 -3.833 
 
(0.538) (0.747) (0.538) (0.738) (0.548) (0.791) 
DS -0.573 -0.573 -0.572 -0.596 -0.591 -0.516 
 
(0.173) (0.176) (0.173) (0.177) (0.173) (0.179) 
Constant (a) -3.046 -2.698 -3.045 -2.770 -3.340 -3.108 
 
(0.409) (0.594) (0.410) (0.579) (0.435) (0.541) 
Observations 5079 5079 5079 5079 5079 5079 
K-P F statistics  217.65  111.75  7.748 
Hansen's Jp  0.7255  0.7465  0.5869 𝐵! + 𝐸𝑉𝐵!=0; p-val   (Reject) (Reject)   
anypta94 +  𝑃𝐵!= 0;     
p-val         (Reject) 
(Fail to 
reject) 
No. of parameters 98 98 99 99 99 99 
RED: 5 % significance; BLUE: 10 % significance  
 
4.2  Actual: Preferences under all PTAs versus preferences under some but not 
all PTAs and full preference versus partial preferences 
As discussed previously, the official tariffs and the actual tariffs are often not the same. 
Therefore, Table 4.2 investigates the same issues discussed for Table 4.1, but in this case we use 
actual instead of official tariff measures. In particular, we estimate equation-23, using ordinary 
least square (OLS) and an instrumental variable approach, to find the stumbling block effect 
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caused by actual preferential tariffs on the US MFN tariff bounds. The results are described in 
columns 1 and 2. In terms of econometric model, the OLS results are shown in columns 1, 3 and 
5 of Table 4.2. Columns 2, 4 and 6 of Table 4.2 have different specifications where we use 
GMM estimator and instrument for endogenous variables. All specifications include the same 
two digits of the harmonized standard industry dummies used in Limão 2006. 
In column 1, the coefficient of 𝐴!(ANYPTAactual), is 0.383. We find that products 
receiving actual full preferential access to the US markets have a statistically significant 
stumbling block effect on the MFN tariff bounds. The OLS estimation in column 1 may be 
biased due to endogeniety. Therefore, we also present and discuss the IV regression of column 1 
in column 2. The estimate for the coefficient on 𝐴!, ∅ in column two is 2.415, and is statistically 
significant. Therefore, we find that products receiving actual full preferential access to the US 
markets have a statistically significant stumbling block effect on the MFN tariff bounds.  
In column 3 we check if the magnitude of the stumbling block effect varies over different 
goods depending on whether it receives full actual preferential access in the US by all its PTA 
partners as against some but not all PTA partners.  In column 3, the coefficient of the variable 𝐴!, ∅ suggests that products that receive actual full preferential access in some PTAs have a 
stumbling block effect on the MFN tariff bounds. The coefficient of 𝐸𝑉𝐴! (EVERYPTAactual) 
is not statistically significant.  From the test of the sum of the coefficients for 𝐴!   𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑉𝐴! we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis. Meaning, we did not find any stumbling block effect on the 
MFN tariff bounds from goods that get actual full preferences under all PTAs. 
 Following the same logic from column 2, that due to endogeniety we might have a bias 
in the OLS regression in column 3, so we present IV approach to account for the same in column 
4.  We found that the coefficient of 𝐴! ,  suggests a stumbling block effect for goods that receive 
actual full preferential access to US market under some PTAs. Coefficient of 𝐸𝑉𝐴!is negative 
and statistically not significant. From the test of summation of coefficients of 𝐴!   and 𝐸𝑉𝐴! we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we found no stumbling block effect on the MFN 
tariff bounds from the products that receive actual full preference under all PTAs. 
Columns 5 and 6 investigate whether goods that receive actual partial preference rather 
than actual full preferential access to the US market also have an effect on multilateral tariff 
changes. From the OLS estimation in column 5, we found that coefficient of ‘anypta94’ is 
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positive and statistically significant. The coefficient of 𝑃𝐴! (ParANYPTAactual) is negative and 
significant at 10 % level. From the summation test: anypta94 and 𝑃𝐴! we reject the null 
hypothesis. Therefore we found that both, the products that get actual full preference and the 
products that get actual partial preferences cause stumbling block effect on the MFN tariff 
bounds, but the stumbling block effect form the former is greater than the latter. 
Column 6 takes the IV approach for column 5 to account for endogeniety.  The 
coefficient of ‘anypta94’ suggests a significant stumbling block effect.  The coefficient of 𝑃𝐴! is 
negative and significant. From the summation test: anypta94 + 𝑃𝐴! we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis. Therefore, we found that only the products with actual full preferences seem to cause 
(on average) a stumbling block effect on the MFN tariff bounds. 
In our analysis we found that products that get full preferences in actual under any PTA 
show a stumbling block effect. The coefficient of 𝐴! from column 2 (2.415) above means, that on 
an average the drop in the US MFN tariff bounds on the products that receive actual full 
preferences is 2.4 percentage points less as compared to non PTA goods. Our results in columns 
1 and 2 of Table 4.2 are in line with Limão (2006) results.  On the other hand, our estimates for 𝐴!   and 𝐸𝑉𝐴! do not support the theory that if a product receives full preferences in actual under 
all of the above mentioned PTAs then the stumbling block effect should be stronger for these 
products as compared to the products that receive full preferences under some PTAs but not all.  
In fact, columns 3 and 4 of table 4.2 shows that we did not find any stumbling block effect from 
the group of products that get actual full preferences under all PTAs.17  Our estimates from the 
OLS regression in column 5 contradict the results of Karacaovali and Limão (2008) and we 
found that the products receiving partial preferences in actual under any PTA also have a 
stumbling block effect, though this effect is smaller than the products that get full preferences in 
actual under any PTA. However, the IV regression in column 6 supports the results of 
Karacaovali and Limão (2008). We found that on average only products with actual full 
preferences cause a stumbling block effect. 
 
                                                
17 Notice that our results also differ from Karacaovali and Limão (2008), where they use official full preferences in 
case for EU. 
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Table 4.2: Estimates of Stumbling Block and Multilateral Negotiation Effects: Actual 
preferences-full, Partial, any PTA and every PTA 
Dependent variable: 
Tariff diff (Δτ) 
OLS IV GMMS OLS 
IV 
GMMS OLS IV GMM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 𝐴! (∅) 0.383 2.415 0.382 2.159 
    (0.095) (0.653) (0.095) (0.494) 
  anypta94 
 
  
 
1.235 2.289 
  
 
  
 
(0.232) (0.398) 𝑃𝐴! 
 
  
 
-0.163 -1.648 
  
 
  
 
(0.099) (0.467) 𝐸𝑉𝐴! 
 
 0.725 -12.035 
    
 
 (1.722) (39.379) 
  BARPOW (β) 0.011 0.006 0.011 0.007 0.010 0.008 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
TOTLIB (ρ) -0.003 0.025 -0.003 0.024 -0.003 0.023 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
TOT*NTB -0.015 -0.085 -0.015 -0.084 -0.016 -0.085 
  (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.013) 
NTB -1.121 -4.531 -1.121 -4.465 -1.228 -4.655 
  (0.544) (0.784) (0.544) (0.769) (0.544) (0.766) 
DS -0.628 -0.653 -0.627 -0.685 -0.637 -0.674 
  (0.179) (0.190) (0.179) (0.194) (0.178) (0.181) 
Constant (a) -2.213 -2.280 -2.214 -2.140 -3.125 -2.443 
  (0.402) (0.568) (0.402) (0.513) (0.438) (0.537) 
Observations 5079 5079 5079 5079 5079 5079 
K-P F statistics  109.44  0.128    16.401 
Hansen's Jp  0.6104  0.6465  0.7851 𝐴! + 𝐸𝑉𝐴!=0; p-val   (Fail to reject) (Fail to reject)   
anypta94 + 𝑃𝐴! =0; 
p-val     (Reject) 
(Fail to 
reject) 
No. of parameters 98 98 99 99 99 99 
RED: 5 % significance; BLUE: 10 % significance 
 
4.3 Book: Full preferences by PTA 
 According to Anson et al. (2005), “The costs involved in complying with the rules of 
origin (ROOs) can be greater than the gains stemming from the preferential treatment if the 
margin of preference is too small. As a result, small enough preference margins can be for 
practice purpose equivalent to no preferences.” Furthermore, Estevadeordal et al. (2008) 
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suggests possible building block effects of large preferential margins “ In particular, because 
sectors with higher preferential trade shares generate larger terms of trade losses vis-à-vis RTA 
partners for the preferential and MFN tariff, governments would benefit more by shifting sources 
to non members in those industries rather than in industries with lower preferential trading 
shares.” They also show that ‘higher preferential import shares are associated with reductions of 
MFN tariffs when meaningful preference margins are present’. We address these issues in our 
analysis below. Limão (2006) does not account for difference in size of preference. As discussed 
previously, we created several variables that differentiate the products with meaningful margins 
from the products that get preferences but these preferences are below 3 %. In this section we 
present our results for the same. 
 Table 4.3, Column 1 shows the OLS estimate of the effect from products with full official 
preferences and with large margins, on the US MFN tariff bounds. The coefficient of 𝐵! is 
postitive and statistically significant suggesting a stumbling block effect (on tariff bounds) from 
the products that receive full preferences in the books. The coefficient of 𝐵𝐿! 
(ANYPTABooklarge94) is negative and statistically significant. From the summation test: 𝐵! + 𝐵𝐿!, we reject the null. Hence, we found that the group of products that get full preferences 
with small margin in books under any PTA create a stumbling block effect on the MFN tariff 
bounds. Group of products that get full preferences with large margin in books under any PTA 
also create a stumbling block effect but this effect is smaller than the former group. On an 
average, the drop in the US MFN tariff bounds of the products that receive full preferences with 
large margin in books is 1-percentage points less. 
 Column 2 shows the IV GMM estimates for column 1. We created an additional IV (𝐵𝐿78!") to control for endogeniety of the variables identifying products with economic 
meaningful margins in the books (see Appendix B, Table B-3). The coefficient of 𝐵! is postitive 
and statistically significant suggesting a stumbling block effect. The coefficient of 𝐵𝐿! is 
negative and statistically significant. From the summation test: 𝐵! + 𝐵𝐿!, we reject the null. 
Therefore, we found that the group of products that get full preferences with small margin in 
books under any PTA create a stumbling block effect. Group of products that get full preferences 
with large margin in books under any PTA also create a stumbling block effect but this effect is 
smaller than the former group. Meaning, on an average, the drop in the US MFN tariff bounds of 
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the products that receive full preferences with large margin in books is 1.7 percentage points less 
as compared to non-PTA goods. 
 In column 3, the OLS estimation shows the effect from the goods with official full 
preferences, large margins and large exports. The coefficient of 𝐵! is positive and statistically 
significant. The coefficient of 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝐵!" (LargeExportsandMarginBook) is positive but statistically 
not significant. From the summation test: 𝐵! +   𝐿𝐸𝑀𝐵!" we reject the null hypothesis. Hence we 
found that the stumbling block effect from products that receive full preferences in any PTA in 
books but have either small margin or small export volume, is identical to the products that get 
full preferences in any PTA in the books but with big margin and large export volume. 
Therefore, our results do not completely support Estevadeordal et al. (2008) theory that ‘higher 
preferential import shares are associated with reductions of MFN tariffs when meaningful 
preference margins are present’. 
 Column 4 shows the IV GMM estimates for the column 3. The coefficient of 𝐵! is 
positive and statistically significant. The coefficient of 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝐵! is positive and statistically not 
significant. From the summation test: 𝐵! +   𝐿𝐸𝑀𝐵! we reject the null hypothesis. Hence, we 
found that the stumbling block effect from products that receive full preferences in any PTA in 
books but have either small margin or small export volume, is identical to the products that get 
full preferences in any PTA in the books but with big margin and large export volume. 
 In columns 5 and 6, we investigate the effect of full preferential access in each PTA on 
US MFN tariff bounds. This is similar to the strategy employed in Limão (2006) and in 
Karacaovali & Limão (2008). Most importantly, it allows us to test whether the effects of full 
preferences vary between unilateral and bilateral preferential agreements. The coefficients of 
ATPA and CBI are statistically not significant. The coefficient of GSP (unilateral agreement) is 
positive and significant only at 10 % suggesting a stumbling block effect. The coefficients of 
Israel (FTA) and NAFTA (FTA) are significant at 5 % and also suggest a stumbling block effect. 
From the summation test (ATPA+ CBI+ GSP - ISRAEL- NAFTA), the coefficient of summation 
is positive and we reject the null. This suggests that unilateral agreements have a greater 
stumbling block effect than bilateral agreements in the case of the US.  
 Column 6 shows the IV GMM for column 5. The coefficients of ATPA, CBI and GSP are 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting a stumbling block effect from the goods that get 
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full preferential access to the US market under these above mentioned unilateral PTAs. The 
coefficient of Israel (FTA) is statistically not significant. The coefficient of NAFTA (FTA) is 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting a stumbling block effect from goods that get full 
preferential access to the US market in books under NAFTA (FTA). From the summation test: 
ATPA+CBI+GSP-ISRAEL-NAFTA=0, we reject the null hypothesis. The coefficient of 
summation test is positive. Therefore we found that the products imported from the FTAs like 
NAFTA and Israel have a smaller stumbling block effect as compared to products imported 
under unilateral preference like ATPA, CBI and GSP.  
 In our analysis we found a stronger stumbling block effect from the group of products 
that get full preferences in books but have small margins as compared to the group of products 
that have full preferences in the books but with large margins (column 1 & 2).  Limão (2006) 
does not distinguish between small and large margins. Limão (2006) found a 48 % higher 
stumbling block effect from important exports (export value of good i from each given PTA 
exceeds the mean export value of that PTA to the US in all goods). We modified the definition of 
‘important exports’, and as discussed previously created 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝐵! to measure the effects of full 
preferences in books for products with significant exports and large margins. Also, shown in 
column 3 and 4 of Table 4.3, we found that the stumbling block effect on MFN tariff bounds, 
from products that receive full preferences in any PTA in books, but have either small margin or 
small export volume, is identical to the products that get full preferences in any PTA in the 
books, but with big margin and large export volume. As compared to Limão (2006) our result is 
more relevant if we consider the intuition from Estevadeordal et al. (2008): ‘sectors with higher 
preferential trade shares generate larger terms-of-trade losses vis-à-vis RTA partners for given 
preferential and MFN tariffs, governments would benefit more by shifting sources to non 
members in those industries, rather than in industries with lower preferential trading shares.’ We 
also found (columns 5 and 6) that the products getting full preference in books and imported via 
a unilateral PTA (ATPA, CBI and GSP) have a larger stumbling block than products getting full 
preferences in the books and imported via FTAs (NAFTA and ISRAEL).  Our instruments also 
pass the IV tests making these results reliable. 
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Table 4.3: Estimates of Stumbling Block and Multilateral Negotiation Effects: Preferences in 
book by PTA and margins 
Dependent variable:  
 Tariff diff (Δτ) 
OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 𝐵! (∅) 1.708 5.398 1.083 1.792 
 
  
  (0.176) (0.951) (0.141) (0.502) 
 
  𝐵𝐿! -0.717 -3.689 
   
  
  (0.120) (0.643) 
   
  𝐿𝐸𝑀𝐵! 
  
0.010 0.747 
 
  
  
  
(0.106) (0.590) 
 
  
NAFTA  
   
0.766 0.556 
  
    
(0.127) (0.139) 
ATPA  
   
-0.120 0.501 
  
    
(0.119) (0.171) 
CBI  
   
0.042 0.477 
  
    
(0.111) (0.154) 
GSP  
   
0.227 0.839 
  
    
(0.116) (0.266) 
ISR 
    
0.365 0.060 
  
    
(0.100) (0.125) 
BARPOW (β) 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.010 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
TOTLIB (ρ) -0.003 0.015 -0.003 0.019 -0.002 0.021 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
TOT*NTB -0.014 -0.077 -0.014 -0.080 -0.015 -0.082 
  (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) 
NTB -0.917 -4.066 -0.896 -4.232 -0.976 -4.256 
  (0.536) (0.741) (0.537) (0.752) (0.542) (0.760) 
DS -0.561 -0.461 -0.574 -0.643 -0.649 -0.731 
  (0.172) (0.184) (0.173) (0.190) (0.175) (0.180) 
Constant (a) -3.111 -3.509 -3.047 -2.775 -2.846 -2.332 
  (0.407) (0.610) (0.409) (0.600) (0.410) (0.461) 
Observations 5079 5079 5079 5079 5079 5079 
K-P F statistics 
 
30.531  13.137 
 
 101.844 
Hansen's Jp 
 
0.3426  0.6837 
 
 12.939 𝐵! + 𝐵𝐿! = 0;  p-val (Reject) (Reject)     𝐵! + 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝐵! =0; p-val 
  
(Reject) (Reject) 
 
  
ATPA+CBI+GSP-ISR-
NAFTA=0; p-val     (Reject) (Reject) 
No. of parameters  99  99  99  99  102  102 
RED: 5 % significance; BLUE: 10 % significance 
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4.4 Actual: Full preferences by PTA 
 We then repeated the same exercise with Actual Tariffs and the results are presented in 
Table 4.4. Column 1 shows the OLS estimate of the effect from products with full actual 
preferences and with large margins, on the US MFN tariff bounds. The coefficient of 𝐴! is 
positive and statistically significant. Meaning, on an average, the drop in the US MFN tariff 
bounds of the products that receive full actual preferences is 0.8 percentage points less as 
compared to non-PTA goods. While the coefficient of 𝐴𝐿!(ANYPTAactuallarge) is negative and 
statistically significant. From the summation test: 𝐴! + 𝐴𝐿𝑖  we reject the null hypothesis. Thus we 
found that the set of products that get actual full preferences with small margin under any PTA 
create a stumbling block effect. Group of products that get actual full preferences with large 
margin under any PTA also create a stumbling block effect but this effect is smaller than the 
prior: (0.882 - 0.598) 
 Column 2 gives the IV GMM estimates for column 1. We created an additional IV 
(𝐴𝐿78!") to control for endogeniety of the variables identifying products with economic 
meaningful margins in actual (see Appendix B, Table B-3). The coefficient of 𝐴! suggests a 
significant stumbling block effect. The coefficient of 𝐴𝐿! is negative and statistically significant 
and from the test of the two we reject the null hypothesis. Therefore our IV results are in 
concurrence with our OLS results. Both create stumbling block effect but the effect from the 
group of products that get actual full preferences with small margin under any PTA have a 
stronger effect than the group of products that get actual full preferences with large margin under 
any PTA: 9.045-8.009 
 The OLS estimate in column 3 shows that the coefficient of 𝐴! is 0.4 and statistically 
significant. The coefficient of 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝐴! (LargeExportsandMarginActual) is statistically not 
significant. From the test of summation of the two variables we reject the null hypothesis. The 
stumbling block effect of products that receive full preferences in any PTA in actual but have 
either small margin or small export volume, is the same as for the group of products that get full 
preferences in any PTA in actual but with big margin and large export volume. 
 Column 4 presents the IV-GMM estimation for column 3. These results are in 
concurrence with the OLS estimation and we found that the stumbling block effect from the 
products that receive full preferences in any PTA in actual but have either small margin or small 
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export volume, is the same as from the group of products that get full preferences in any PTA in 
the actual but with big margin and large export volume. 
 Column 5 gives us the OLS estimates of stumbling block effect from individual PTAs. 
The coefficients of ATPA, CBI and GSP are positive but statistically not significant. The 
coefficient of Israel (FTA) is positive and significant at 5 %. The coefficient of NAFTA (FTA) is 
positive but statistically insignificant. The summation test shows that on average there is no 
distinction between FTAs and unilateral preferential programs.  
 Column 6 shows the IV GMM for column 5. The coefficients of ATPA, CBI and GSP are 
positive and significant suggesting a stumbling block effect on the US MFN tariff bounds. The 
coefficient of ISRAEL is positive and statistically significant at 10 %, also suggesting a 
stumbling block effect. The coefficient of NAFTA is negative and statistically not significant. 
From the summation test, we reject the null (ATPA+CBI+GSP-ISRAEL-NAFTA=0). Hence, we 
concur that on an average the unilateral programs cause a greater stumbling block effect on the 
US MFN tariff bounds than FTAs. 
 In our analysis we found a stronger stumbling block effect from the group of products 
that get full preferences in actual but have small margins as compared to the group of products 
that have full preferences in actual but with large margins (column 1 & 2).  As mentioned above, 
Limão -2006 does not distinguish between small and large margins. As shown in column 3 and 4 
of Table 4.4, we found that the stumbling block effect from products that receive full actual 
preferences in any PTA but have either small margin or small export volume, is identical to the 
products that get full actual preferences in any PTA but with big margin and large export 
volume. We also found (columns 6) that the products getting full actual preference and imported 
via a unilateral PTA (ATPA, CBI and GSP) have a larger stumbling block than products getting 
full preferences in the books and imported via FTAs (NAFTA and ISRAEL). Our instruments 
pass the IV tests of over-identification and under-identification suggesting that our instruments 
are strong. 
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Table 4.4: Estimates of Stumbling Block and Multilateral Negotiation Effects: Actual 
preferences by PTA and margins 
  
Dependent variable:  
 Tariff diff (Δτ) 
OLS IV GMM OLS IV GMM OLS IV GMM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 𝐴! (∅) 0.882 9.045 0.411 2.573   
 (0.148) (1.798) (0.098) (0.668)   𝐴𝐿! -0.598 -8.009     
 (0.137) (1.575)     𝐿𝐸𝑀𝐴!   -0.167 -1.176   
   (0.137) (1.284)   
NAFTA     0.082 -0.018 
     (0.124) (0.135) 
ATPA     0.052 0.923 
     (0.127) (0.237) 
 CBI     0.146 0.994 
     (0.120) (0.226) 
GSP     0.090 2.245 
     (0.119) (0.743) 
ISR     0.443 0.289 
     (0.096) (0.148) 
BARPOW (β) 0.010 0.005 0.011 0.008 0.011 0.010 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
TOTLIB (ρ) -0.003 0.019 -0.003 0.022 -0.003 0.021 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
TOT*NTB -0.014 -0.077 -0.015 -0.083 -0.014 -0.082 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) 
NTB -1.122 -4.438 -1.106 -4.372 -1.119 -4.469 
 (0.543) (0.839) (0.543) (0.791) (0.544) (0.777) 
DS -0.604 -0.308 -0.621 -0.614 -0.675 -0.799 
 (0.178) (0.235) (0.179) (0.201) (0.179) (0.195) 
Constant (a) -2.244 -2.786 -2.215 -2.319 -2.144 -1.336 
 (0.401) (0.660) (0.402) (0.564) (0.401) (0.457) 
Observations 5079 5079 5079 5079 5079 5079 
K-P F statistics  12.985  9.034  23.796 
Hansen's Jp  0.6205  0.7004  15.993 𝐴! + 𝐴𝐿!=0; p-val (Reject) (Reject)     𝐴! + 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝐴! =0; p-val   (Reject) (Reject)   
ATPA+CBI+GSP-ISR 
-NAFTA=0; p-val 
    (Fail to 
reject) 
(Reject) 
No. of parameters 99 99 99 99 102 102 
RED: 5 % significance; BLUE: 10 % significance 
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4.5 Book: Applied Tariffs 
 Estevadeordal et al. (2008) use Applied tariffs in their study on Latin American 
countries. As discussed before, applied tariffs often change between the two WTO rounds. 
Therefore, we check how the US MFN Applied tariffs change in relation to the PTAs in Table 
4.5. Meaning, we investigate the stumbling block effect on the US Applied MFN tariffs caused 
by products receiving full preferential tariffs in books. The OLS results are showed in columns 1, 
3 and 5 of Table 4.5. Columns 2,4 and 6 of Table 4.5 have different specifications where we use 
GMM estimator and instrument for endogenous variables. All specifications include the same 
two digits of the harmonized standard industry dummies used in Limão 2006. 
 Column 1 shows the OLS estimation but with ∆𝐴𝜏!" (see Appendix B, Table B-3) as the 
explained variable. The coefficient of 𝐵! , in column one is 0.053. The direction of the effect is in 
line with the results found in column 1 of Table 4.1, but the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. Therefore, we did not find any statistically significant stumbling block effect on the 
Applied tariffs from the group of products receiving full preferential access in the books to the 
US markets. The OLS estimation in column 1 may be biased due to presence of endogeniety. 
Hence, we also present and discuss the IV regression for column 1 in column 2. The estimate for 
the coefficient on 𝐵!, in column two is 0.182 and it is statistically not significant. Therefore, we 
find that products receiving full preferential access in books to the US markets do not have any 
statistically significant stumbling block effect on the US Applied MFN tariffs.  
 In column 3 and 4, we investigate the effect of full official preferences in the presence of 
tariff bounds that restrict the Applied tariffs. For this purpose we created two new variables 
(𝐵𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑94!   𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑_94  !)18 that we have discussed above in section 2.4. In the OLS estimation 
shown in column 3, the coefficient of 𝐵! is -0.281 and statistically significant at 10 % level. 
Meaning, on an average, the drop in the US MFN Applied tariff of the products that receive full 
official preferences is 0.281 percentage points more as compared to non-PTA goods that are also 
not bound by the MFN tariff bounds. The coefficient 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑_94  ! suggesting that on an average, 
the drop in the Applied tariffs for the goods constraint by tariff bindings is 0.38 percentage 
points less as compared to the non-PTA goods that are also not constraint by tariff bindings. We 
                                                
18 To control for endogeniety that could be caused by the new variables, we also constructed a new IV- 
barpowerbind94 (see appendix B, Table B-3). 
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found a similar effect for goods that received full preferences in books and were restricted by 
tariff bindings (𝐵𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑94!). From the summation test: ANYPTAbook94 + 
.68*ANYPTAbookbind94 = 0, we fail to reject the null hypothesis.19 Therefore, we did not find 
any stumbling block effect on the US Applied tariffs from the products that get full preference in 
books under any PTA and are constraint by the US MFN bound tariffs. 
  Column 4, gives the IV GMM estimates for column 3. The coefficient of 𝐵! is negative 
and statistically not significant. The coefficient of   𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑_94  ! is more in line with the intuition 
that the Applied tariffs restricted by MFN tariff bounds tend to fall more in order to comply with 
WTO regulations. The coefficient of 𝐵𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑94  ! is positive and statistically not significant.  From 
the summation test of the variables we fail to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we did not 
find any statistically significant effect from the group of products that get full preferences in the 
books under any PTA and are constraint by the MFN tariff bounds on the US Applied tariffs. 
 Column 5 gives us the OLS estimates of stumbling block effect from the individual 
PTAs. It is basically equivalent to Table 4.3, column 5 but the explained variable is ‘∆𝐴𝜏!"’ in 
this case. The coefficient of NAFTA is positive and statistically significant, suggesting a 
stumbling block effect on the US Applied MFN tariff from the products receiving full 
preferential access in books, to the US market under NAFTA. The coefficient of GSP is negative 
and statistically significant. The coefficients of other PTAs are not significant. From the   
summation test: ATPA + NAFTA=0 we reject the null hypothesis. Since the coefficient of the 
summation test is positive, we found that full preferences in the book for the two regimes 
(NAFTA and ATPA) on average have a stumbling block effect on the US MFN Applied tariffs. 
Column 6 shows the IV GMM for the above column. The coefficients of all the PTAs are 
statistically not significant. Additionally, we failed to reject the summation test (ATPA + 
NAFTA=0). Therefore, we did not find any significant effect from goods that get full preferences 
in books under the FTAs (NAFTA & Israel) or the unilateral trade agreements (ATPA, CBI & 
GSP). We are aware of the limitation of these results, as the instruments seem to be weak but the 
F-statistics shows a p-value equal to zero, i.e., the summation of coefficients (including the 
binary variables) is different from zero.  
                                                
19 Notice that the effect of the products receving full preferences in books, on the US Applied tariffs is the 
summation of the coefficients of ANYPTAbook94 and ANYPTAbookbind94 multiplied by 0.68 (the mean value of 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑_94!). 
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Table 4.5: Estimates of Stumbling Block and Multilateral Negotiation Effects: Applied tariffs 
and preferences in books 
Dependent variable:  
 Tariff diff (ΔAτ) 
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 𝐵! (∅) 0.053 0.182 -0.281 -0.574 
 
  
  (0.062) (0.145) (0.152) (0.917) 
 
  𝐵𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑94  ! 
  
0.377 1.083 
 
  
  
  
(0.166) (1.140) 
 
  𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑_94  ! 
  
0.379 -5.559 
 
  
  
  
(0.192) (0.833) 
 
  
NAFTA  
   
0.215 1.016 
  
    
(0.067) (1.041) 
ATPA 
    
-0.003 0.071 
  
    
(0.059) (0.111) 
CBI 
    
-0.078 0.024 
  
    
(0.060) (0.120) 
GSP 
    
-0.163 -0.120 
  
    
(0.068) (0.217) 
ISR 
    
0.053 -0.063 
  
    
(0.047) (0.128) 
BARPOW (β) 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.087 0.004 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.015) (0.001) (0.002) 
barrowpowerbind94 
  
-0.004 -0.112 
 
  
  
  
(0.004) (0.019) 
 
  
NTB 0.311 0.087 0.330 0.113 0.293 0.314 
  (0.111) (0.073) (0.116) (0.144) (0.108) (0.240) 
DS -0.048 0.014 0.087 -0.132 -0.036 0.051 
  (0.080) (0.075) (0.360) (0.705) (0.080) (0.146) 
Constant (a) -0.634 -0.744 -0.776 3.423 -0.598 -1.385 
  (0.192) (0.232) (0.241) (0.722) (0.200) (0.748) 
  
     
  
Observations 4546 4546 4336 4336 4546 4546 
K-P F statistics 
 
253 
 
11 
 
2.37 
Hansen's Jp 
 
0 
 
0.04 
 
0.09 
ANYPTAbook94 + 
0.68*ANYPTAbookbin
d94 
  
(Fail to 
reject) 
(Fail to 
reject) 
 
  
NAFTA +ATPA=0     (Reject) 
(Fail to 
reject) 
No. of parameters 94 94 96 96 98 98 
RED: 5 % significance; BLUE: 10 % significance 
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4.6 Actual: Applied Tariffs 
In Table 4.6, we estimate the stumbling block effect on the US Applied MFN tariffs 
caused by the actual preferential tariffs. The OLS results are showed in columns 1, 3 and 5 of 
Table 4.6. Columns 2,4 and 6 of Table 4.6 have different specifications where we use GMM 
estimator and instrument for endogenous variables. All specifications include the same two digits 
of the harmonized standard industry dummies used in Limão 2006. 
In column 1, the coefficient on 𝐴!, in column one is 0.074. The direction of the effect is 
in line with the results found on column 1 of Table 4.2 but the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. Therefore, no stumbling block effect was found on the Applied tariffs from the group 
of products that that products receiving full actual preferential access to the US markets. The 
OLS estimation in column 1 may be biased due to endogeniety. Thus, we also present and 
discuss the IV regression of column 1 in column 2. The estimate for the coefficient on 𝐴!, in 
column 2 is 0.339, and it is statistically significant at 10 % level. Therefore, we find that 
products receiving full actual preferential access to the US markets do create a stumbling block 
effect. Meaning, on an average, the drop in the US MFN Applied tariff of the products that 
receive full preferences in actual is 0.34 percentage points less as compared to non-PTA goods. 
In column 3, we investigate the effect of full actual preferences in the presence of tariff 
bounds that constrain the Applied tariffs.  The OLS estimates of the coefficients of 𝐴!  and 𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑94  ! are statistically not significant. From the summation test: 𝐴!  + .68*𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑94  !=0, we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we did not find any stumbling block effect on the US 
Applied tariffs from the products that get full actual preferences under any PTA and are 
constraint by the US MFN bound tariffs. Column 4 gives the IV GMM estimates for column 3. 
The coefficients of 𝐴!   and 𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑94  !  are statistically not significant. The coefficient of 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑94  ! 
is more in line with the intuition, that on an average the Applied tariffs constraint by the tariff 
bounds should drop more in order to comply with the WTO regulations. From the summation 
test of the variables we fail to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore we did not find any 
statistically significant effect on the US Applied tariffs from the group of products that get full 
actual preferences under any PTA and are constraint by MFN bound tariffs.  
Column 5 gives us the OLS estimates of stumbling block effect from the individual 
PTAs. The coefficient of NAFTA is positive and statistically significant, suggesting a stumbling 
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block effect. The coefficients of other PTAs are not statistically significant. From the summation 
test: ATPA + NAFTA=0 we fail to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we found that full 
preferences in the book for the two regimes (NAFTA and ATPA) on average do not have any 
stumbling block effect on Applied MFN Applied tariffs. Column 6 shows the IV GMM for 
column 5. The coefficients of all the PTAs are statistically not significant. Therefore, we did not 
find any significant effect from goods that get full actual preferences under the FTAs (NAFTA & 
Israel) or the unilateral trade agreements (ATPA, CBI & GSP). From the summation test also, we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we did not find any stumbling block effect in total. 
We are aware of the limitation of these results, as the instruments seem to be weak but the F-
statistics shows a p-value equal to zero, i.e., the summation of coefficients (including the binary 
variables) is different from zero. 
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Table 4.6: Estimates of Stumbling Block and Multilateral Negotiation Effects: Applied tariffs 
and Actual preferences 
Dependent variable:  
 Tariff diff (ΔAτ) 
OLS IV OLS 
IV 
GMMS 
OLS IV GMM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 𝐴! (∅) 0.074 0.339 -0.028 -0.265 
 
  
  (0.054) (0.200) (0.142) (1.241) 
 
  𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑94  ! 
  
0.096 0.876 
 
  
  
  
(0.147) (1.567) 
 
  bind_94! 
  
0.625 -5.424 
 
  
  
  
(0.176) (0.889) 
 
  
NAFTA  
   
0.172 0.492 
  
    
(0.070) (1.226) 
ATPA 
    
0.004 0.125 
  
    
(0.068) (0.146) 
 CBI 
    
-0.065 0.128 
  
    
(0.069) (0.152) 
GSP 
    
-0.094 -0.156 
  
    
(0.066) (0.513) 
ISR 
    
0.056 0.058 
  
    
(0.045) (0.116) 
BARPOW (β) 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.090 0.003 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.014) (0.001) (0.002) 
barpowerbind94 
  
-0.004 -0.117 
 
  
  
  
(0.004) (0.017) 
 
  
NTB 0.309 0.092 0.346 0.141 0.297 0.115 
  (0.109) (0.070) (0.112) (0.140) (0.107) (0.118) 
DS -0.052 -0.001 0.081 -0.122 -0.039 -0.004 
  (0.080) (0.075) (0.368) (0.705) (0.080) (0.156) 
Constant (a) -0.634 -0.808 -1.000 3.263 -0.620 -0.800 
  (0.185) (0.235) (0.237) (0.774) (0.185) (0.441) 
Observations 4546 4546 4336 4336 4546 4546 
K-P F statistics 
 
123.8 
 
11.521 
 
1.329 
Hansen's Jp 
 
0 
 
0.0346 
 
0.0411 𝐴! + 
0.68*𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑94  !=0 
  
(Fail to
reject) 
(Fail to 
reject) 
 
  
NAFTA +ATPA=0 
    
(Fail to
reject) 
(Fail to 
Reject) 
No. of parameters 94  94 96 96 98 98 
RED: 5 % significance; BLUE: 10 % significance 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
We analyze the effect of PTAs on US multilateral liberalization. The effects of the 
formation of PTAs on multilateral tariffs policies have been an important topic of discussion in 
the literature for the last two decades and this is particularly true for the case of the US economy. 
Our modeling strategy borrows a great deal from Limão (2006). We modify it to present some 
new insights on the impact of the PTAs on US MTL. Using the detailed data from USITC, WTO 
on the US MFN bound & Applied tariffs and data used by Limão (2006) for other specifications 
we create subgroups of the US imports and present the effect on US MTL from these groups.  
We found that the only the group of products that get full preferences under any PTA 
either in books or in actual generate a stumbling block effect on the US MFN tariff bounds.  
Unlike Limão (2006), we found no additional stumbling block effect from the group of products 
that received full preferences in books under all PTAs. Furthermore, in case of actual tariffs we 
did not find any stumbling block effect from the group of products that received full preferences 
in actual under all PTAs. Our results were in line with Karacaovali & Limão (2008), as we also 
found that on average the group of products that receive partial preferences in books or in actual 
under any PTA did not create any stumbling block effect.  
We found that the group of products that get full preference with large margins in books 
or in actual have a smaller stumbling block effect as compared to the group of products that 
receive full preferences but in books or in actual but with small margins. Possibly, though the 
small margins are barely any preferences for practical purposes, owing to rules of origins and 
other NTBs, but are still considered worth holding on to by the PTA parties. The other reason for 
such a result could be large volume of exports that can make even the small margin beneficial to 
the exporting partners, we check for the same. We found that the stumbling block effect from 
products that receive full preferences in any PTA in books or in actual but have either small 
margin or small export volume, is identical to the products that get full preferences in any PTA 
in books or in actual but with big margin and large export volume.  
One more important result from our analysis was that we found that the FTAs (NAFTA 
and ISRAEL) have a smaller stumbling block effect as compared to the unilateral trade 
agreements (ATPA, CBI and GSP). The obvious reason is the nature of the agreements. A 
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bilateral agreement like FTA (more focused on the exchange of preferential access) is entirely 
focused on trade issues while the unilateral agreements are a way of extending economic support 
to the beneficiary countries on non trade issues (helping them fight drugs, following labor laws, 
fighting terrorism etc.).  
 In our analysis, we did not find any statistically significant stumbling block effect on the 
US MFN Applied tariffs, form the group of products that receive full preferences in books under 
any PTA. But we did find the stumbling block effect on the US MFN Applied tariffs, form the 
group of products that receive full preferences in actual under any PTA. Our IV results concur 
with the intuition that on an average the Applied tariffs should fall more if constraint by MFN 
tariff bounds. We did not find any statistically significant stumbling block effect on the US 
Applied tariffs, from the group of products that get full preferences officially or in actual under 
any PTA, and are constraint by the US MFN bound tariffs. Most importantly, on an average we 
did not find any statistically significant stumbling block effect on the US MFN Applied tariffs 
from the two regimes (ATPA and NAFTA) that were created within the time frame (1989 -1996) 
that we consider for the US Applied tariffs in our analysis. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1: List of PTA partners in 1994  
PTA NAME PTA NAME          PTA NAME 
               
PTA NAME  
ISRAEL Israel GSP Cayman Islands     GSP Malta GSP Wallis, Futuna  
  GSP Central African    
Western Sahara 
 
NAFTA Canada  Rep. GSP Mauritius GSP  
NAFTA Mexico GSP Chad GSP Morocco GSP Western Samoa  
ATPA Bolivia GSP Chile GSP Mozambique GSP Yemen Ar. Rep  
  GSP 
Christmas 
Island    
Zaire 
 
ATPA Colombia  (Austr.) GSP Namibia GSP  
ATPA Ecuador GSP Cocos (Keeling) GSP Nepal GSP Zambia  
ATPA Peru GSP Comoros GSP New Caledonia GSP Zimbabwe  
CBI Anguilla GSP Congo GSP Nicaragua    
CBI 
Antigua and 
Barbuda GSP Cook Islands GSP Niger    
CBI Aruba GSP Cote d'Ivoire GSP Niue    
CBI Bahamas, The GSP CROATIA GSP Norfolk Island    
CBI Barbados GSP Cyprus GSP Oman    
CBI Belize GSP Czech Republic GSP Pakistan    
CBI Costa Rica GSP Djibouti GSP Palau    
CBI Dominica GSP Egypt GSP 
Papua New 
Guinea    
CBI 
Dominican 
Republic GSP 
Equatorial 
Guinea GSP Paraguay    
CBI El Salvador GSP Estonia GSP Philippines    
CBI Grenada GSP Ethiopia GSP Pitcairn Islands    
CBI Guatemala GSP Falkland Islands GSP Poland    
CBI Guyana GSP Fiji GSP Romania    
CBI Haiti GSP 
French 
Polynesia GSP Russia    
CBI Honduras GSP Gambia, The GSP Rwanda    
CBI Jamaica GSP Ghana GSP Saint Helena    
CBI Montserrat GSP Gibraltar GSP 
Sao Tome 
Principe    
CBI 
Netherlands 
Antilles GSP Greenland GSP Senegal    
CBI Panama GSP Guinea GSP Seychelles    
CBI Saint Lucia GSP Guinea Bissau GSP Sierra Leone    
  CBI St Vincent and GSP 
Heard, 
McDonald      
CBI Grenadines  Isl. GSP Slovakia    
CBI St. Kitts and Nevis GSP Hong Kong GSP Slovenia    
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CBI 
Trinidad and 
Tobago GSP Hungary GSP 
Solomon 
Islands    
CBI 
Turks and Caicos 
Islands GSP India GSP Somalia    
CBI 
Virgin Islands, 
British GSP Indonesia GSP South Africa    
GSP Albania GSP Jordan GSP Sri Lanka    
GSP Angola GSP Kazakhstan GSP Suriname    
GSP Argentina GSP Kenya GSP Swaziland    
GSP Bahrain GSP Kiribati GSP Tanzania    
GSP Bangladesh GSP Kyrgyzstan GSP Thailand    
GSP Benin GSP Latvia GSP Togo    
GSP Bhutan GSP Lebanon GSP Tokelau    
GSP BOSNIA-H GSP Lesotho GSP Tonga    
GSP Botswana GSP Lithuania GSP Tunisia    
GSP Brazil GSP Macau GSP Turkey    
  GSP 
British Indian 
Ocean        
 Territory GSP Macedonia GSP Tuvalu    
GSP Bulgaria GSP Madagascar GSP Uganda    
GSP Burkina Faso GSP Malawi GSP Ukraine    
GSP Burundi GSP Malaysia GSP Uruguay    
GSP Cameroon GSP Maldives GSP Vanuatu    
GSP Cape Verde GSP Mali GSP Venezuela    
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Appendix B 
Table B-1  
Binary Variable/ 
PTA’96 
% of products that qualify 𝐵!" 𝐵𝐿!" 𝐴!" 𝐴𝐿!" 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑜!"# 
ATPA’96 11.9 7.6 8.8 5.5 12.2 
CBI’96 18.5 11.9 12.5 7.9 18.9 
GSP’96 35.2 26.8 8.9 6.0 35.2 
ISRAEL’96 24.5 17.7 19.0 13.7 24.5 
NAFTA’96 50.6 32.0 20.7 11.6 66.1 
Source: author using data provided by Romali’s dataset and USIT website 
 
Table B-2 
BOOK 
Binary Variable % of products 
ANYPTABook:  𝐵! 61.46 
ANYPTABooklarge: 𝐵𝐿! 48.05 
EVERYPTABook:   𝐸𝑉𝐵! 3.86 
EVERYPTABookLarge:   𝐸𝑉𝐵𝐿! 3.17 
Total products: 8625 
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Table B-3 
 
Variable Name Description 
Δτ [(𝑈𝑟𝑢𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑦_𝑡!"#$%&!"# )   −   (𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑦𝑜_𝑡!"#$%&!"# )] 
ΔAτ 
US MFN Applied tariff 1996- US MFN Applied tariff 
1989 
ANYPTAactual: 𝐴! 1  𝑖𝑓𝐴!"# = 1  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑎𝑛𝑦  𝑗;   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  0 
ANYPTAactualLarge:  𝐴𝐿! 1  𝑖𝑓𝐴𝐿!"# = 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑎𝑛𝑦  𝑗;   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  0 
EVERYPTAactual: 𝐸𝑉𝐴! 1  𝑖𝑓𝐴!"# = 1  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑎𝑙𝑙  𝑗  ;   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  0 
EVERYPTAactualLarge: 𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐿! 1  𝑖𝑓𝐴𝐿!"# = 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑎𝑙𝑙    𝑗  ;   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  0 
ParANYPTAactual: 𝑃𝐴! 1  𝑖𝑓  Limao!"# = 1    &  𝐴!"# = 1  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑎𝑛𝑦  𝑗  ;   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  0 
ParEVERYPTABook:  𝑃𝐸𝑉𝐵!" 1  𝑖𝑓    Limao!"# = 1    &  𝐵!"# = 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑎𝑙𝑙  𝑗  ; 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  0   
ParEVERYPTAactual: 𝑃𝐸𝑉𝐴! 1  𝑖𝑓  Limao!"# = 1    &  𝐴!"# = 1  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑎𝑛𝑦  𝑗  ;   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  0 
“LargeExportsandMarginActual”: 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝐴!" 
1 if a product gets full preferences in any PTA in actual 
with meaningful margins (greater than 3 %) and has large 
export volume (export value of good ‘i’ from any PTA 
exceeds the mean export value of that PTA to the Us in all 
goods.) 
Anyprefbookfulllarge78: 𝐵𝐿78!" 1  𝑖𝑓  𝐵𝐿!"# = 1  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑎𝑛𝑦  𝑗  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡 = 1978  ;   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  0 
Anyprefactualfulllarge78: 𝐴𝐿78!" 1  𝑖𝑓𝐴𝐿!"# = 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑎𝑛𝑦  𝑗  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡 = 1978  ; 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  0 bind_94! 1 if 𝑡𝑎𝑟_𝑢𝑟𝑦! <= AppliedT_MFN94!+0.05  bind_78! 1 if 𝑡𝑎𝑟_𝑇𝑘𝑦! <= AppliedT_MFN89!+0.05 
ANYPTAactualbind: 𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑94  ! 𝐴!*bind_94 
Anyexp78bind94 
bind_78!* anyexp94 {where ‘anyexp94’ is same as  Limão 
(2006)} 
barpowerbind94  
bind_94! ∗ barpow  {where ‘barpow’ is same as  Limão 
(2006)} 
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Table B-4 
ACTUAL 
Binary Variable % of products 
ANYPTAactual: 𝐴! 42.2 
ANYPTAactualLarge:  𝐴𝐿! 32.29 
EVERYPTAactual: 𝐸𝑉𝐴! .07 
EVERYPTAactualLarge: 𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐿! .01 
Total products: 8625 
 
Table B-5 
Mean drop in tariff 
BOOK ACTUAL 
PTA Non PTA PTA Non PTA 
MFN Tariff 
Bounds 2.7 4.2 2.7 3.5 
MFN Applied 
Tariff 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.7 
 
 
 
 
